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Cyber Threats and Healthcare Organizations: A Public Health Preparedness Perspective 
 
Lauren E. Branch 
 
 
Healthcare in the United States, heavily reliant on digital technology in service provision, has 
recently seen an increase risk of cyberattacks. Coordinated electronic medical records, imaging, 
pharmaceutical services, lab services and even treatment devices all rely on electronic connectivity 
and represent critical services that must be secured from cyberthreats. Hospitals have become 
increasingly complex systems, and this often makes the organization more vulnerable to failure.  
Planning for these events is often hard for hospitals because their main charge is to provide life-
saving care to patients as they need it.   This is a relatively new threat to healthcare organizations, 
and there has not been limited research on this hazard and its impacts on healthcare organizations. 
Therefore, the aim of the first study was to assess the trend of successful major malware 
attacks on healthcare organizations in the United States between 2016 and 2017.  Previous 
research found limited research specific to malware attacks and found most articles covering 
ransomware were restricted to news articles.  A content analysis was conducted on articles from two 
well-renowned health IT organizations.  This study identified 49 attack cases across 27 states.  
Based on previously reported statistics, the number of identified cases was low meaning healthcare 
organizations are not reporting their attacks.  A true risk assessment cannot be completed by the 
industry until a more representative trend analysis can be completed.        
The aim of the second study was to assess the organizational outcomes of a malware attack 
on a healthcare organization.  Previous research on this health hazard discussed healthcare’s lack 
of preparedness for this new threat but did not delve in to the organization’s response, mitigation, 
and recovery from attacks.  Therefore, qualitative interviews were conducted with key stakeholders 
from three organizations that suffered malware attacks during the years 2016-2017.  Topics covered 
were system impact, system recovery and business continuity, and changes to organizational 
preparedness efforts.  One of the main findings from this study was the realization by health 
stakeholders how connected their organization, and therefore the provision of care, has become.  
Participants also discussed their lack of full understanding on the potential impact these attacks 
could have on their organizations before their attack, including the loss of every digital system within 
their facility.  A need was expressed across all facilities that more information about these attacks 
need to become shared across the industry to better prepare organizations and protect patient 
safety.     
The final aim of the final study was to examine organizational preparedness efforts and to 
identify the organizational barriers to mitigating the threats arising from cyberattacks.  A survey was 
conducted among healthcare emergency mangers to assess their perceptions of preparedness for 
cyber threats.  While the majority of respondents reported feeling either confident or very confident in 
both their individual and their organizational ability to respond to a cyber attack, their responses 
regarding preparedness actions their organization has taken against cyber threats were lacking.  
When it comes to events like ransomware, where attack impacts are still not fully understood, the 
healthcare industry remains less prepared.  
 In conclusion, these studies indicate a need for data related to cyberattacks to be collected in 
a central repository that is either made public or shared among healthcare stakeholders.  In order to 
best prepare their organizations, there needs to be accurate risk assessments completed and areas 
for preparedness with the best return on investment can then be identified.  Cyberattacks are only 
expected to increase over the next five years.  Patient care is put at risk during each of these attacks 
and it is essential for healthcare organizations to be better prepared for this new hazard to keep the 
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Organizations today face a myriad of hazards they must prepare for to ensure a safe 
environment for clients, employees, and to ensure business continuity.  These hazards can 
range from a facility threat such as fire or loss of power, to a safety threat such as an active 
shooter.  To better prepare for these threats and to coordinate a more efficient response, 
organizations develop emergency operating procedures.  Cybercrime is a new and emerging 
threat that must be considered when preparing an institution’s emergency operating procedures.   
One specific industry that is particularly vulnerable to cybercrime is the healthcare 
industry due to their reliance on electronic health information, as well as their outdated security 
systems (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Krise, 2016).  Coordinated electronic medical records, 
imaging, pharmaceutical services, lab services and even treatment devices all rely on electronic 
connectivity and represent critical services that must be secured from cyber threats.  An even 
newer threat to healthcare organizations are malware attacks, where cybercriminals can encrypt 
an organization’s files, essentially shutting that organization off electronically.  Beginning in 
2016, there has been a string of ransomware attacks on hospitals across the United States. 
In May 2017, there was an outbreak of more than 75,000 ransomware attacks that 
targeted at least 99 countries around the globe, which experts are calling one of the biggest 
cybersecurity incidents they have seen (Larson, 2017).  As part of this attack, at least 36 
healthcare organizations across Great Britain were locked out of their computer systems 
causing the National Health Service to cancel outpatient appointments and divert patients away 
from emergency departments (Perlroth & Sanger, 2017).  In December 2017, a Homeland 
Security advisor said this attack and its effects directly put lives at risk (Chappell & Neuman, 
2017).   
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Not only does this threat put patients’ health at risk, but these attacks cost the United 
States healthcare system an exorbitant amount of money.  In 2015 alone, the FBI received 
2,500 complaints of ransomware attacks across all industries, which cost the victims $214 
million (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016).  An American Public Health Association 
publication cited a technology report which said in 2016 there were 1,500 cyberattacks on 
health-related organizations that exposed personal information on over 155 million Americans.  
This publication also noted that the cost of healthcare data breaches is highest across all 
industries (Krisberg, 2017). 
Very few studies have examined ransomware attacks, and how they could potentially 
affect healthcare organizations. A systematic review published in 2016, found only 19 articles 
published in peer-reviewed journals between 2008 and 2015 on the topic, and the majority of 
these focused on data breaches of protected health information (Luna et al., 2016).  It is 
essential to understand the risk, mitigation, and preparedness of this threat to protect the safety 
of those within and of those served by the hospital (Ayala, 2016).  There is a need to catalog the 
existing cyber threats hospitals face and to expand their knowledge of organizational 
preparedness and mitigation of these threats. 
Background 
Environmental Health is tasked with making the natural or built environment a safer 
place for those utilizing it (Healthy People 2020, 2017).  Healthy People 2020 highlighted 
disaster preparedness as an emerging issue in the field of Environmental Health (Healthy 
People 2020, 2017).  Within this area, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has an 
Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, which is “committed to strengthening the 
nation’s health security by protecting against public health threats, whether they begin at home 
or abroad, or if they are natural or man-made” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2017).   
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This paper serves as a public health preparedness exploration of the new and emerging 
cyber threats to healthcare organizations within the United States. Its defined environment is 
that of the hospital, and the cyber threats hospitals now face is the new threat to the safety of 
those within this environment.   
Hospital safety 
Patient safety and quality of care are two ways that hospitals are evaluated on 
environmental safety.  The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), part of the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, is tasked with producing evidence to 
help improve the safety and quality of healthcare services (AHRQ, 2016).  The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) use evidence put forth by AHRQ to help set quality 
goals and enforces these goals with their healthcare providers (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2016).  The Joint Commission is another group that works to improve patient 
safety and quality of care.  This is a non-profit accreditation group for hospitals, which evaluates 
patient safety and quality of care before giving a hospital the ‘golden seal of approval’.  This 
accreditation earned by hospitals shows that the facility is committed to providing safe and high 
quality care to all its patients (The Joint Commission, 2017).  
Even though organizations like The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and Joint Commission work to ensure a safe environment for both patients and 
employees, an emergency or disaster situation can drastically change a facility’s day-to-day 
operations.  Disasters often require healthcare workers to put in long hours, which puts them at 
an increased risk of injury (Dembe, Erikson, Delbos, & Banks, 2005).  To help ensure hospitals ’ 
ability to both respond to hazards effectively and to continue to provide a safe environment of 
care for patients and staff, there are certain regulatory requirements in place specific to 
emergency management.  First, The Joint Commission provides a chapter of standards specific 
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to Emergency Management, which a hospital must meet to be eligible for accreditation.  Under 
the first requirement hospitals must conduct a hazard vulnerability assessment to see what 
hazards their hospital may have to deal with.  The next requirement is that the hospital must 
have a written Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) that addresses communications, 
resources, safety, staff, utilities, and patient care.  The final requirement is that healthcare 
facilities must exercise their EOP twice a year to make sure their plan is current and viable (The 
Joint Commission E-dition, 2016).  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has also 
developed new requirements for Emergency Management in healthcare.  The new standards 
were released in September of 2016 and became effective on November 15, 2016. This new 
ruling states that the existing regulations are insufficient in ensuring a healthcare facility will be 
able to provide for their community during times of disaster (Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 
2016).  The community served by hospitals includes not only patients, families, and visitors, but 
workers as well (Cagliuso, 2014a). The ruling focuses on three essential areas: ‘safeguarding 
human resources, maintaining business continuity, and protecting physical resources.  The 
ruling addresses all parts of the disaster cycle: prepare, respond, mitigate, and recover.  
Qualified providers much develop a new emergency preparedness program to include a 
thorough risk assessment, plans and policies that address hazards identified in the risk 
assessment, training and exercising of the plans and polices, and an additional communication 
plan to allow for two-way communication between providers and their employees (See Figure 
1).  The goal of this CMS ruling is to enhance healthcare facilities’ ability to continue providing 
care to their served community during times of disasters.     
Cybercrime and cyberterrorism on the rise 
Over the past 30 years, cybercrime and cyberterrorism have grown from potential 
concern to common threat.  Cyber threats became a national security issue following Y2K and 
9/11 (Stohl, 2007).  After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, President Bush created the Office of 
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Cyberspace Security to be managed by Richard Clarke (Weimann, 2005).  In this position, 
Clarke continued to raise the issue of a potential cybersecurity attack on various United States 
targets (Stohl, 2007).  There was also a special congressional commission created after the 
attack on 9/11 to examine terrorism risks to the United States.  This commission was concerned 
with the potential use of a cyberattack in conjunction with a regular terrorist attack (Weimann, 
2005).     
Often, the terms used to define cyberattacks are used interchangeably when they have 
different meanings.  Denning (2000) defines Cyberterrorism as “the convergence of cyberspace 
and terrorism”.  This means for an act to be classified as cyberterrorism, it must have a cyber 
aspect, as well as have the motivation to create fear or coercion on a government or a specific 
population (Weimann, 2005).  Potential targets for cyberterrorism exist among the United States 
infrastructure, including the nation’s financial network, any type of traffic control including air and 
train travel, electrical grids or dams, and water-treatment plants (Squitieri, 2002).  There are 
also fears that terrorists could use a cyberattack in concert with a traditional terrorist attack to 
hinder the rescue efforts taking place (Weimann, 2005; Squitieri, 2002).  There are aspects of 
cyberterrorism that may make it more appealing to terrorists than traditional terror attacks.  First, 
cyberterrorism is conducted remotely, making it easier for the perpetrators to remain 
anonymous.  Second, cyberattacks are much cheaper than traditional terror attacks.  Finally, the 
reach and potential impact that terrorists have with cyberattacks is far greater than with 
traditional terror attacks (Weimann, 2005).   
Cybercrime is defined as an unlawful act in which a computer may be the tool and/or the 
victim (Dashora, 2011).  According to the FBI, billions of dollars are spent each year repairing 
systems that have been affected by cybercrime.  One of the major targets of cybercrime is data, 
particularly identifiable data, including identities, bank accounts, and electronic medical records 
(EMRs).  In 2006, it was estimated that identity theft costs U.S. business over $50 billion with an 
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additional $5 billion in expenses to individuals (Kshetri, 2009).  A study by the Ponemon Institute 
saw a 19% rise in cybercrime in 2015 (Gordon, 2016).  Along with the rising trend of 
cybercrimes, these kinds of attacks are becoming more complex and far reaching.  
One of the most notorious cyberattacks in 2016 was the hacking that took place during 
the U.S. Presidential Election.  Russian hackers leaked confidential emails and documents from 
both the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign 
Committee.  It has also become apparent since the election that Russia had a hand in trying to 
influence who became President of the United States (Lipton, Sanger, & Shane, 2016).  In 
2016, President Obama said that the United States has the potential to be more vulnerable than 
other nations to cyberattacks because of the large size of the U.S. economy and because of the 
high amount of digitization in this country (Kelly, 2016).   
In March of 2018, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations released a joint statement regarding Russian hacking of critical United States 
infrastructure (Naylor, 2018).  Some targets of Russian hacking include nuclear power plants, 
our electrical energy sector, and commercial facilities.  The statement states the U.S. 
Intelligence Community has known about Russian hackings in the U.S. since at least March of 
2016.  In the summer of 2016, Russia launched a ‘multi-stage intrusion campaign’ against U.S. 
utilities, and an outcome of this attack was hackers gained access to at least one power plant’s 
control system.  In 2015, Russian hackers disrupted power to more than 200,000 people in 
Ukraine when they hacked a power plant and shut down services (Naylor, 2018).  A New York 
Times article claims that Russia has been targeting U.S. and European critical infrastructure, 
including water treatment facilities, since 2015.  This same article also discusses claims from 
private security firms that these coordinated attacks have been occurring since 2013 (Perlroth & 
Sanger, 2018).  
7 
 
One specific cybercrime is a ransomware attack, which has become much more 
common against organizations (Larson, 2017).  There was a 159% jump seen in ransomware 
attacks from March to April of 2016.  The normal increase between months had previously been 
only 9-20% (Lee, 2016 May).   The FBI says that in 2016, there were 2,673 victims of 
ransomware attacks across the United States.   
Attacks of this kind have been seen on many different types of organizations, including 
government/municipalities, education, churches, law enforcement, commercial businesses, and 
even the healthcare sector. During late 2017 to early 2018, three counties in North Carolina 
were targeted and attacked.  In December 2017, Mecklenberg County, NC was the victim of a 
foreign-based hacker who gained access to the system by using a government employee’s log-
in information.  When county officials made it clear they would not pay the $23,000 ransom, 
hackers made more attempts to get further in to the system (Douglas & Harrison, 2017).  In 
February 2018, Davidson County was attacked and all county systems, including phone 
systems, were affected.  This attack directly compromised the county’s 911 Emergency 
Communication System (Hightower, 2018).  These threats pose a direct risk to public health 
emergency preparedness (Barnett, Snell, Lord, Jenkins, Terbush, & Burke, 2013).   
Two major ransomware attacks, WannaCry and NotPetya, occurred within a month of 
each other in the summer of 2017 and had effects seen around the globe.  The WannaCry 
attack took place in May 2017, and infected computers in 150 countries.  This attack has since 
been linked to North Korea (Nakashima, 2018).  The other major attack was the NotPetya 
attack, in June of 2017, which has since been linked to Russia (Nakashima, 2018). The 
NotPetya virus infected computers in Denmark, India, and the United States, but most of its 
victims were located in Ukraine.  This virus mocked a ransomware virus while it was in fact 
permanently deleting files.  A few affected organizations were banks, energy companies, an 
airport, and government officials.  One U.S. company that was affected was the pharmaceutical 
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company, Merck.  Employees were said to be sent home from all U.S. plants during this attack, 
and a report on the impact of the attack said Merck revenue went down $135 million due to lost 
sales (Davis, 2017).   
According to a 2016 Justice Department Report, on average in 2016 there were up to 
4,000 ransomware attack attempts a day.  This was a 300% increase from the average number 
of daily attacks seen in 2015. Ransomware is no longer a threat of a future, but rather one that 
all organizations must take seriously.   
Hospitals role during disasters   
According to the American Hospital Association (AHA), there were 5,534 registered 
hospitals in the United States at the start of 2018.  These hospitals serve as major medical care 
providers for their communities, providing emergency services, outpatient visits, surgeries, and 
births.  In 2015, the AHA states 142 million individuals were treated in U.S. emergency 
departments, and there were 581 million outpatient visits at U.S. hospitals in the same year 
(American Hospital Association, 2017).  The AHA touts U.S. hospitals as also being economic 
anchors for their communities.  They provide employment for more than 5.7 million individuals, 
and purchase almost $852 billion in goods and services from other businesses (American 
Hospital Association, 2017). 
Hospitals also serve as a major component of the Nation’s disaster response framework 
(Barnett et al., 2013).  Shutting healthcare providers down via cyberattack would hinder our 
Nation’s response ability to any type of disaster, natural or manmade, and could seriously impair 
the ability to protect public health.  In the event of an emergency, hospitals will be responsible 
for handling a patient surge and for providing care to any and all that need it (Barbera, Yates, & 
Macintyre, 2009; Sauer, McCarthy, Knebel, & Brewster, 2009).  As part of the National 
Response Framework, there were 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) identified for 
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disaster response.  These ESFs provide a structure for the Federal response to any emergency.  
Each of these functions provides support, services, and resources for the specific need during a 
response.  Healthcare services during disaster response falls into ESF-8, Public Health and 
Medical Services, and the services that fall under ESF-8 include medical care personnel, 
medical equipment, hospital care, and outpatient care (Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response, 2015). 
Prior to 9/11, hospitals’ main emergency management concern were both physical 
threats to the facility itself, such as a flood or tornado, and the patient surge caused during a 
community emergency (Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, 2009).  After 9/11, the way our country 
viewed emergency preparedness changed drastically.  President George W. Bush created the 
Department of Homeland Security to create a more coordinated effort in preparing for terrorist 
attacks.  To create the Department of Homeland Security, 22 Federal agencies and 
departments were pulled under the DHS umbrella.  After the creation of the DHS, the President 
issued different Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) to better define policies 
related to national security.  Many of these directives were related to preparedness within the 
health care system.  HSPD-8, issued in 2003, clearly defines hospitals as emergency response 
providers (Sauer et al., 2009).  This means that hospitals must provide for the medical needs of 
the community during a disaster.  In 2004, HSPD-10 was issued in response to bioterrorism 
fears.  This directive says that hospitals must be prepared for all hazards, including explosives 
and bioterrorist attacks.   
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) also plays a large role in 
emergency response for public health and medical care.  Specific to hospitals is the Hospital 
Preparedness Program (HPP), which was created under DHHS in 2002 to prepare hospitals for 
bioterrorism and pandemic flu (Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, 2009).  This program was 
originally administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) branch of 
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DHHS.  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA) was passed to help our nation better prepare for and be better at responding to 
disasters (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017).  With the 
passing of the PAHPA in 2006, Congress created the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and directed the HPP to be shifted from HRSA to ASPR.  
Currently, the HPP is still run through ASPR to provide funding for hospital emergency 
preparedness efforts.  This funding program is a way to ensure hospitals meet certain response 
capabilities defined by the federal government (Sauer et al., 2009).  The goal of the HPP is to 
improve community response coordination and to strengthen healthcare resources and tools 
available for medical emergency response.   
The Joint Commission requires hospitals to conduct a risk assessment of their facility 
once per year (Marx & Slonim, 2003).  This risk assessment will prioritize certain threats to the 
facility, and show what areas the hospital needs to focus on with their preparedness efforts.  
Hospitals have become increasingly complex systems, and this complexity often makes the 
organization more vulnerable to failures and attacks (Morton, 2011).  Low probability high 
impact events normally occur without much warning.  Planning for these types of events is often 
hard for hospitals because their main charge is to provide life-saving care to patients as they 
need it.  Hospitals are generally more concerned with high probability low impact events, such 
as medical errors and patient safety, rather than cyberattacks. 
One hospital tool that is critical to help manage patient surge during disasters is the 
electronic medical record.  Not only do hospital staff need quick access to patient records as the 
patient is admitted for care, but electronic medical records also provide a way to track disaster 
patients throughout the emergency.  The different cyber risks healthcare providers now face 
threaten to diminish their ability to provide critical care during times of emergency.   
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Cyber terror: Is the US healthcare system safe? 
Amid growing threats of cyberattacks in the United States, it is important for hospitals to 
be better prepared to prevent a successful attack. Some of the cyber threats facing the 
healthcare industry include data breaches and malware viruses.  With the shift to electronic 
medical records (EMRs), cybersecurity within healthcare first began as an important issue 
regarding Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) compliance (Perakslis, 
2014).  HIPAA requires safeguards be put in place to ensure privacy and protection of sensitive 
information (Luna et al., 2016).   Another important piece of legislation regarding privacy and 
EMRs is the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act.  
This Act increased funding for health information technology to further “meaningful use” through 
technology like EMRs, which was a term created by CMS.  The goal of “meaningful use” was to 
improve quality, safety, and efficiency of care, to reduce disparities, and to improve coordination 
of care by allowing patient care information to have a central storage where all providers could 
access data and care history (See Figure 2).  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
developed the EHR Incentive Program which offered payments as an incentive for providers to 
both purchase EHRs and to demonstrate “meaningful use” with patient care.  The goal of the 
incentive was improvement of population health.  The EMR Incentive Program increased the 
use of certified health IT, and in 2016 around 96% of hospitals across the country were using 
EMRs (Figure 3).  This increased use brings about a larger need for privacy protection (Barnett 
et al., 2013; Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 2017).   
Although data privacy is a priority for healthcare providers, breaches in patient 
information still occur.  According to Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) breach 
database, in October 2015, over 163,000 individual health records were breached.  The Office 
of Civil Rights within DHHS claims that over 113 million medical records were breached in 2015.  
A recent study published in The Journal of the American Medical Associated performed a 
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content analysis on breach data from the DHHS database between the years 2010 and 2017 
(McCoy and Perlis, 2018).  The study found that healthcare providers have seen an increase in 
data breaches since the passing of the HITECH Act in 2009 (See Figure 4).  In 2017, healthcare 
providers reported 37.2 million cumulative records being breached.  There are different causes 
of data breaches, including theft, loss, improper disposal, and hacking/IT incident.  The authors 
of the JAMA study separated the data out by breach type (See Figure 5).  Breaches due to 
hacking/IT incidents have steadily increased since 2010 but saw a spike since 2015.  The 
number of breaches due to hacking or IT incident almost doubled between 2015 and 2016.  In 
2017, data breach by hacking/IT incident because the number one breach type in healthcare.   
Threats like malware and ransomware are relatively new to the healthcare industry.  A 
systematic review published in 2017 showed that the healthcare industry is less prepared for 
cyber security issues than other industries (Kruse et al., 2017).  With regard to cyber threats, 
hospitals take precautions with data privacy, including training all staff on HIPAA policy, 
because they are cautious of repercussions to any violations.  But when it comes to events like 
ransomware, where attacks used to be considered rare, the organization as a whole is less 
prepared.  There has been a more recent push for hospitals by groups like Joint Commission to 
prepare for low probability high impact events, events that are less likely to happen but could 
have a larger impact on the organization.   
During ransomware attacks, hackers will use malware to lock the computers within a 
network and demand a ransom payment for the decryption code.  These kinds of attacks 
essentially shut down the hospital’s ability to operate electronically and can potentially affect 
patient care.  The major global attack in May of 2017 that locked 36 health organizations out of 




Due to their inherent nature, hospitals make perfect targets for ransomware attacks.  
They depend on up to date patient records and health data to provide critical care to their 
patients. Approximately 95% of hospitals use health information technology, including electronic 
medical records (Luna et al., 2016).  These electronic records hold essential information, such 
as medication needs and patient care directives, and may be needed at a moment’s notice.  
Malware attacks would lock out access to these records and put patient safety at risk.   
This type of attack is a new cyber-threat for hospitals, and therefore many organizations 
have out of date cybersecurity systems and have not trained staff on security awareness.  Many 
hospitals focus on training staff to be HIPAA compliant because of the data privacy pressures, 
and fail to train them on how to keep the organization’s system safe as a whole (Zetter, 2016).  
One of the main routes of entry for malware viruses are through phishing attacks.  These 
attacks will send an email to members of the organization with a malicious link or attachment, 
and once an individual clicks on the link or opens the attachment the virus has a way in to the 
network.   
Another factor that makes hospitals a perfect target for ransomware attacks is their 
status as a business.  Over time hospitals have evolved from providing a social service for their 
local communities to becoming a business tasked with making a profit (Barbera et al., 2009, 
Cagliuso, 2014a).  If a ransomware attack shuts down the hospital’s ability to care for patients, 
the hackers are also stopping the hospital from making their profit.  Making a small ransom 
payment might be seen as the most beneficial solution to hospital executives, so that hospital 
staff can get back to work and continue to see patients.   
Timeline of hospital attacks  
An outbreak of ransomware attacks on hospitals began in February of 2016 at the 
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, California.  The hospital was negatively 
14 
 
impacted for days and eventually decided to pay the ransom.  After their computers were offline 
for over a week, the ransom payment was made for approximately $17,000 and the hospital 
regained access to its systems.  Since this initial attack in the healthcare field, there has been a 
large increase in reported ransomware attacks across hospitals in the United States.   
These attacks within the United States were not the only ones seen on healthcare 
organizations since 2016.  There were also ransomware attacks seen on hospitals in Canada 
and Great Britain (Chappell & Neuman, 2017, Lee, 2016 Mar; Chung, 2016).  There are 
different reports on how often this is occurring to healthcare organizations, but there has not 
been a report created on successful attacks.  The risk reports that do exist also don’t expound 
on the nature and scope of these attacks.  Some of these attacks are affecting just a few 
computers within organizations, while other attacks are significantly impacting the organization’s 
ability to provide patient care.  Due to the initial payment of the Los Angeles Hospital and the 
inherent nature of hospitals, these types of attacks are only believed to continue to grow in 
frequency.   
Gaps in Literature 
Cybersecurity has been a research topic of concern for quite some time (Stohl, 2007; 
Weimann, 2005). However, this topic was discussed more as a potential concern that should be 
considered when developing threat preparedness plans (Squitieri, 2002).  It wasn’t until more 
recently, when these concerns started coming to fruition, that there was an increase in the 
healthcare literature (Dashora, 2011).  The JAMA Article discussed above summarized data 
breaches using the DHHS data portal including breaches by hacking, however the data lacks 
any other type of cyber threats facing healthcare and is limited to a data breach as the outcome.   
A search of the literature found two systematic reviews published on this topic since 
2016, both completed by Texas State University (Kruse et al., 2017; Luna et al., 2016).  The first 
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review found 19 articles related to this topic of cybersecurity and healthcare (Luna et al., 2016).  
This review identified threat types, discussed in the literature, including data breaches, internal 
and external threats, cyber-squatting, and cyberterrorism.  The reviewers noted that data 
breaches were the most common cyber threat to healthcare.  Only one of their 19 identified 
articles discussed Denial of Service attacks on healthcare, but there was no mention of 
ransomware in this review.  The second review focused more on the modern threats healthcare 
faces in cybersecurity (Kruse et al., 2017).  The review included ‘ransomware’ as a search 
criterion, which was not included in the first systematic review.  This search returned 31 articles 
that were analyzed. One of the themes the authors saw in their article review was that cyber 
threats to healthcare organizations are growing, and there is a systematic lack of preparedness 
seen across this industry sector. One of the limitations of this review the authors noted was 
many of the articles returned were from news sources and not from peer-review publications.  
They attribute this to ransomware being such a new threat to healthcare organizations.   
Another topic covered in the literature is information technology (IT) solutions to 
cybersecurity issues.  This literature lives in the IT world, using IT language to span the vast 
array of cybersecurity threats.  The articles discuss potential end points or ways in to a system, 
as well as potential solutions or patches to stop anyone getting in to a system. One research 
article pointed out that much of the literature covers IT’s role during cyber emergencies, and 
how IT departments are tasked with getting systems back up and running after an attack 
(Barnett et al., 2013).   
From a public health and a threat preparedness perspective, the literature identifies 
cyber threats as a problem for the healthcare industry, but the research does not delve much 
deeper in to the topic.  One article which links cyber threats directly to public health states the 
exact effects on public health, as well as potential mitigation strategies against this type of threat 
is lacking from the literature (Barnett et al., 2013).  This research project hopes to better define 
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the threat of ransomware against healthcare, to identify some best practices of organizations 
that have faced attacks and to identify barriers to cyber-preparedness within healthcare 
organizations.  A more robust understanding of cyber threats against hospitals is needed to help 
identify areas for preparedness action and would ultimately make it possible to improve 
cybersecurity preparedness in the healthcare industry.  A hospital environment that is more 
secure against cyber threats is a safer environment for patients, workers, and the community at 
large.  
 
Purpose of the Research 
This study is meant to serve as a descriptive, exploratory study of a new and emerging 
threat to healthcare organizations in this country.  The objective of this project is to assess 
trends in malware attacks against healthcare, to examine organizational best practices to 
mitigate the effects of and to re-establish business continuity after a malware attack, and to 
expand their knowledge of organizational preparedness and mitigation of these threats.  To 
achieve the study objective, I will pursue the following three specific aims. 
 
Specific Aim 1:  
To assess the trend of successful major malware attacks on healthcare organizations in the 
United States between 2016 and 2017.  A content analysis will be conducted on web articles 
related to malware and hospitals to create a summary of successful and publicly reported 
attacks beginning with the 2016 outbreak.  A logic diagram will be created through identifying 
technological assets within a hospital that are vulnerable to cyberattack and could, if 





Specific Aim 2:  
To assess the organizational outcomes of a malware attack on a healthcare organization.  
Interviews will be conducted with key stakeholders in healthcare cybersecurity to compare 
outcomes from three facilities that were victims of malware attacks.  Interview subjects included 
representatives from healthcare IT, emergency management, and administration.  Key 
evaluation questions for interviews will be identified based on existing literature and 
conversations with subject matter experts to assess the impact of a successful malware attack 
on a healthcare organization.   
 
Specific Aim 3:  
To examine organizational preparedness efforts and to identify the organizational barriers to 
mitigating the threats arising from cyberattacks.  A survey will be conducted on safety, 
emergency management, and information technology staff from a healthcare organization on 
their perceptions and knowledge of their organization’s preparedness for cyber threats. The 
survey will be created based on existing literature and interviews with key stakeholders to 
assess the barriers to an organization’s readiness for cyber threats.   
 
This research is significant because it will expand on the knowledge of cyberattacks 
against healthcare organizations, as well as provide novel data on ransomware attacks within 
the healthcare industry.  Completion of this research will provide an understanding of cyber 
vulnerabilities within a hospital and identify what happens to hospitals during malware attacks.  
The results will also preparedness actions hospitals are taking and highlight barriers to 
becoming more prepared for these threats.   
The novel data provided by this research project will allow hospital’s to be more informed 
when making organizational decisions on emergency preparedness and mitigation.  First, 
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having more detailed information regarding a specific threat category against the healthcare 
industry will allow for a more accurate representation of cyber threats within the organizational 
hazard vulnerability assessment (HVA).  The HVA is required by The Joint Commission and 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to ensure a hospital’s ability to continue serving 
their community (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018; The Joint Commission E-
dition, 2016).  A well-informed assessment is the foundation for good preparedness efforts and 
the key to a successful response.  Second, CMS and The Joint Commission also require 
healthcare organizations to review and update their emergency plans annually to ensure 
continuity of operations and provision of patient care.  The CMS Emergency Preparedness Rule 
even requires an emergency plan to cover interruptions to communications, including from 
cyber attack (CMS, 2018).  In order to effectively meet these requirements from regulatory 
agencies and be prepared to ensure continuity of operations during an incident, healthcare 
needs to have a better understanding of the risk these threats pose to their operations and 
provision of care.  Hospitals and healthcare providers serve as a building block in our Nation’s 
disaster response framework (Barnett et al., 2013).  If there is an emergency or disaster in our 
country, hospitals are tasked with providing care to all that need it (Barbera et al., 2009; Sauer 
et al., 2009).  The healthcare industry is facing this new threat they need a more comprehensive 
understanding of to prepare their organizations and to ensure they can remain a cornerstone in 










Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2016 Dec). Quality and patient safety. Retrieved 
from https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/index.html 
American Hospital Association (2018). Fast facts on U.S. hospitals, 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals 
American Hospital Association (2017). Hospitals are economic anchors in their communities. 
Retrieved from https://www.aha.org/statistics/2018-03-29-hospitals-are-economic-anchors-their-
communities 
American Hospital Association (2013). Cyber security and hospitals: Four questions every 
hospital leader should ask in order to prepare for and manage cybersecurity risks. Retrieved 
from https://www.aha.org/system/files/2017-12/ahaprimer-cyberandhosp.pdf 
Ayala, L. (2016). Cybersecurity for hospitals and healthcare facilities: A guide to detection and 
prevention. Berkely: Apress. 
Barbera, J.A., Yeatts, D.J., & Macintyre, A.G. (2009). Challenge of hospital preparedness: 
analysis and recommendations. Disaster Med Pub Health Prep, 3(S1), S74-82. 
Barnett, D.J., Snell, T.K., Lord, R.K., Jenkins, C.J., Terbush, J.W., & Burke, T.A. (2013). Cyber 
security threats to public health. World Med Health Policy, 5(1), 37-46. 
Becker’s Hospital Review (2016, Jun 1) 93% of phishing emails contain ransomware. Becker’s 
Hospital Review, Retrieved from https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-
information-technology/93-of-phishing-emails-contain-ransomware.html 
Cagliuso, N. V. (2014a). Stakeholders’ experiences with US hospital emergency preparedness: 
Part 1. J Bus Contin Emer Plan, 8(2), 156-168. 
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC. (2009). Hospitals rising to the challenge: the first five years of 
the U.S. hospital preparedness program and priorities going forward.  Retrieved from 
http://www.upmchealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2009/2009-04-16-
hppreport.pdf 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2017). Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response. Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/phpr/index.htm 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2018). Core EP rule elements. Retrieved from 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-
Certification/SurveyCertEmergPrep/Core-EP-Rule-Elements.html 





Chappell, B. and Neuman, S. (2017, Dec 19). U.S. says North Korea ‘directly responsible’ for 
wannacry ransomware attack. NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/12/19/571854614/u-s-says-north-korea-directly-responsible-for-wannacry-
ransomware-attack 
Chung, E. (2016, Mar 24). Ontario hospital website may have infected visitors with ransomware, 
security firm says. CBC News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/norfolk-
general-hospital-hack-1.3504229 
Dashora, K. (2011). Cyber crime in the society: problems and preventions. J Alt Persp Soc Sci, 
3(1), 240-259. 
Davis, J. (2017, Oct 27). Petya cyberattack cost Merck $135 million in revenue. Healthcare IT 
News. Retrieved from http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/petya-cyberattack-cost-merck-
135-million-revenue 
Dembe, A.E., Erikson, J.B., Delbos, R.G., & Banks, S.M. (2005). The impact of overtime and 
long work hours on occupational injuries and illnesses: new evidence from the United States. 
Occup Environ Med, 62, 588-597. 
Department of Health and Human Services. Top 10 tips for cybersecurity in health care.  
Retrieved from https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/Top_10_Tips_for_Cybersecurity.pdf 
Douglas, A. and Harrison, S. (2017, Dec 8). After North Carolina county refuses to pay hacker 
ransom, attackers strike again. Government Technology, Retrieved from 
http://www.govtech.com/network/After-North-Carolina-County-Refuses-to-Pay-Hacker-Ransom-
Attackers-Strike-Again.html 
Gordon, P. (2016, Aug 25). Rise of the cyber criminals. Huffington Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rise-of-the-cyber-
criminals_us_57bed90ae4b06384eb3e60b9 
Healthcare IT News & HIMSS Analytics. Healthcare IT News and HIMSS Analytics quick HIT 
survey: Ransomware, 2016. Retrieved from 
https://healthmanagement.org/c/it/news/ransomware-attacks-hit-three-quarters-of-hospitals-
without-them-knowing 
Healthy People 2020. (2017). Environmental Health. Retrieved from 
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/environmental-health 
Hightower, D. (2018, Feb 21). Davidson County, N.C., still reeling from ransomware attack. 
Government Technology, Retrieved from http://www.govtech.com/security/Davidson-County-
NC-Still-Reeling-from-Ransomware-Attack.html 
Justice Department. (2016, Jun). How to protect your networks from ransomware: interagency 




Kelly, M.L. (2016, Dec 16). Obama: espionage is being ‘turbocharged’ by the internet. NPR. 
Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/12/16/505864712/obama-espionage-
is-being-turbocharged-by-the-internet 
Krisberg, K. (2017). Cybersecurity: Public health increasingly facing threats.  The Nation’s 
Health, 107 (8), 1195. 
Kruse, C.S., Frederick, B., Jacobson, T., & Monticone, D.K. (2017). Cybersecurity in healthcare: 
a systematic review of modern threats and trends. Technol Health Care, 25, 1-10. 
Kshetri, N. (2009). Positive externality, increasing returns, and the rise in cybercrimes. Commun 
ACM, 52(12). 141-144. 
Larson, S. (2017, May 13). Massive cyberattack targeting 99 countries causes sweeping havoc. 
CNN Tech, Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/12/technology/ransomware-attack-
nsa-microsoft/index.html 
Lee, S. (2016, May 3). Ransomware attacks reached record high in April- and aren’t slowing 
down: report. Newsweek. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/ransomware-attacks-
reached-record-high-april-and-not-slowing-down-report-455239) 
Lee, S. (2016, Mar 23). Ransomware wreaking havoc in American and Canadian hospitals. 
Newsweek. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/ransomware-wreaking-havoc-american-
and-canadian-hospitals-439714 
Lipton, E., Sanger, D.E., & Shane, S., (2016, Dec 13). The perfect weapon: how Russian 





Luna, R., Rhine, E., Myhra, M., Sullivan, R., & Kruse, C.S. (2016). Cyber threats to health 
information systems: a systemic review. Technol Health Care, 24, 1-9.  
Marx, D.A. & Slonim, A.D. (2003). Assessing patient safety risk before the injury occurs: an 
introduction to sociotechnical probabilistic risk modelling in health care. Qual Saf Health Care, 
12(Supp II), ii33-38. 
McCoy, T.H. Jr., Perlis, R.H. (2018). Temporal trends and characteristics of reportable health 
data breaches, 2010-2017. JAMA, 320(12), 1282-1284. 
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Emergency Preparedness Requirements for Medicare and 
Medicaid Participating Providers and Suppliers, 81 Fed. Reg. 63860 (Sept 16, 2016) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. 403, 416, 418, 441, 460, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 491, & 494).  
Morton, A.P. (2011). Hospital safety and complexity. British Medical Journal, 342, 514.   
22 
 
Nakashima, E. (2018, Jan 12) Russian military was behind ‘NotPetya’ cyberattack in Ukraine, 




Naylor, B. (2018, Mar 23). Russia hacked the U.S. power grid- so what will the Trump 
administration do about it?. NPR. Retrieved from 
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/23/596044821/russia-hacked-u-s-power-grid-so-what-will-the-
trump-administration-do-about-it 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. (2017 Apr 27). Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, ASPR Organization. Retrieved from 
https://www.phe.gov/about/aspr/pages/default.aspx 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. (2015 June 2). Emergency 
support functions. Retrieved from 
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/support/esf8/Pages/default.aspx#8 
Perakslis, E.D. (2014). Cybersecurity in healthcare. N Engl J Med, 371 (5), 395-397. 
Perlroth, N. & Sanger, D.E. (2018, Mar 15). Cyberattacks put Russian fingers on the switch at 
power plants, U.S. says. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/us/politics/russia-cyberattacks.html 
Perlroth, N. & Sanger, D.E. (2017, May 12). Hackers hits dozens of countries exploiting stolen 
N.S.A. tool. The New York Times. Retrieved from  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-national-health-service-
cyberattack.html?_r=0 
Radke, B.A., Waters, M.J., Cleary, J.C., Evans, D., & Kittle, C. (2016, July 18). Ransomware 
rises among hospitals. Lexology. Retrieved from 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8f3d29a5-2f87-42b8-ada1-54a109e38b3f  
Sauer, L.M., McCarthy, M.L., Knebel, A., & Brewster, P. (2009). Major influences on hospital 
emergency management and disaster preparedness. Disaster Med Pub Health Prep, 3(S1), 
S68-73. 
Siwicki, B. (2017 Apr 18) Hackers hit 320% more healthcare providers in 2016 than in 2015, per 
HHS data. Healthcare IT News. Retrieved from 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hackers-hit-320-more-healthcare-providers-2016-2015-
hhs-data 
Squitieri, T. (2002, May 5). Cyberspace full of terror targets. USA Today. Retrieved from 
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/05/06/cyber-terror.htm 
Stohl, M. (2007), Cyber terrorism: a clear and present danger, the sum of all fears, breaking 
point or patriot games?. Crime Law Soc Change, 46, 223-238. 
23 
 
The Joint Commission. (2017 May 10). Hospital accreditation. Retrieved from 
https://www.jointcommission.org/accreditation/hospitals.aspx 
The Joint Commission E-dition. (2016, Jan 1). Hospitals: emergency management. Retrieved 
from https://www.jointcommission.org/standards_information/edition.aspx 
The White House. (2013 Feb 12). Presidential policy directive—Critical infrastructure security 
and resilience.  Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil 
Weimann, G. (2005). Cyberterrorism: the sum of all fears?. Stud Conflict Terrorism, 28, 129-
149. 






















Figure 1: CMS emergency preparedness requirements for qualified providers 
 
 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2018).  Emergency Preparedness Rule. 
Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-
Certification/SurveyCertEmergPrep/Emergency-Prep-Rule.html 













Figure 2: CMS Electronic Health Record Incentive Program  
 
 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2010). Medicare & Medicaid EHR 












Figure 3: United States hospitals using certified health IT, 2016 
 
Source: Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. 'Hospitals 



















Figure 4: Health Breach Summary, 2010-2017 
 
Source: McCoy, T.H. Jr., Perlis, R.H. (2018). Temporal trends and characteristics of reportable 

















Figure 5: Health breach data by breach type, 2010-2017 
 
Source: McCoy, T.H. Jr., Perlis, R.H. (2018). Temporal trends and characteristics of reportable 
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Introduction: The healthcare industry has begun seeing a new hazard develop against them- the 
threat of cyberattack.  Beginning in 2016, healthcare organizations in the United States have 
been targeted for malware attacks, a specific type of cyberattack.  During malware incidents 
hackers can lock users out of their own network to gain access to information or to hold the 
organization for ransom.  With the increase in medical technology and the need for access to 
this information to provide critical care, this type of incident has the potential to put patient lives 
and safety at risk.       
Methods: A content analysis was conducted to assess the trend of attacks on healthcare 
organizations.  U.S. Healthcare IT News and Becker’s Hospital Review were used to co llect all 
publicly reported malware attacks against U.S. healthcare organizations between 2016 and 
2017.  A logic diagram was also developed to illustrate how hackers gain access to a healthcare 
network using malware.   
Results: There were 49 cases of malware attacks against U.S. HCOs identified.  The attacks 
occurred across 27 states, and they took place during 18 out of 24 months.  Six of the 
organizations reported paying ransom, whereas 43 organizations did not pay or did not report 
payment to the press.  Impacts of these attacks range from network downtime to patient and 
staff records being breached.   
Discussion: Malware attacks have the potential to impact care delivery as well as the healthcare 
facility itself.  Even though this study identified 49 malware attacks, we know this number is 
significantly higher based on data from HIMSS and the FBI.  A reporting loophole exists in that 
hospitals are only required to report attacks in the case of breached protected health or financial 
data.  For HCOs to fully understand the risk cyber threats pose, it is important for attacks to 
become public information and for lessons learned to be shared.  Future research reviewing 






















Recently the healthcare industry has been facing a new type of hazard; bad actors have 
started targeting hospitals and other healthcare facilities for cyberattacks.  This industry is 
particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because healthcare providers depend on up to date 
information from electronic health data.  This information includes patient histories and test results 
which is often needed at a moment’s notice to provide critical patient care.  Approximately 95% 
of hospitals in the United States use health information technology, such as electronic medical 
records (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016).  Many other health technologies including 
glucose meters, IV pumps, and implanted medical devices are also connected to and dependent 
on the hospital’s network.  With patient safety on the line, hospitals may be more willing to pay for 
restored access to their network.  Healthcare organizations (HCOs) have become much more 
reliant on health information technology over the past decade.  Another vulnerability that makes 
hospitals susceptible to cyberattacks are the out of date cybersecurity systems at many facilities 
and limited training for staff on safe cyber practices (Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 
2017).  These characteristics combined make HCOs good targets for attack (Luna et al., 2016; 
Waddell, 2016).   
The cyber threats HCOs now face are complex and can come both internally and 
externally to the network (Narayana Samy, Ahmad, & Ismail, 2010).  In a survey conducted by 
the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) of healthcare 
organizations, 37.6% of respondents said their most recent security incident was caused by an 
online scam artist, whereas 20.8% reported a negligent insider and 20.1% reported a hacker as 
the cause (HIMSS North America, 2018).  There are also many points of entry in to a healthcare 
network which have the potential to make them extremely vulnerable (See Figures 1 and 2).  A 
point of entry is a way for bad actors to gain access to a hospital computer or network in order 
to achieve something malicious, whether that be stealing data or delivering a payload virus 
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(Ayala, 2016).  Some points of entry identified in the HIMSS Cybersecurity Survey include 
email, infected hardware or software, compromised medical devices, third party website, and a 
provider or a service linked to the network via the cloud (HIMSS North America, 2018).  Some 
additional points of entry include internet access, a wireless network, removable media (i.e. 
USB drive, laptop), or theft of equipment (Ayala, 2016).  Another way hackers attack is through 
backdoors or unpatched vulnerabilities, which are essentially access points left open across the 
network.   
Figure 1 displays a sample hardware network of an HCO.  Each switch on the diagram 
represents multiple devices connected to the network, and each device presents their own 
multiple points of entry via e-mail, the internet, or USB connections.  Once an infected phone is 
connected to a computer or an infected link from an email is clicked, a virus can be transferred 
to the network and spread. Figure 2 shows an example of a software network within an HCO.  In 
this example, there is a virtual interface with a corporate office with its own clinical and 
administrative management software.  There are also interfaces with many different applications 
used around the organization, including imaging, labs, pharmacy, payroll, and patient 
scheduling.  Each of the applications represents potential points of entry for bad actors to break 
in to the organization.   HCOs must rely on their corporate interfaces as well as third party 
vendors to keep their products secure with up-to-date protections.  With so many different points 
of entry in to the HCO hardware network, these networks have become extremely intricate and 
therefore highly susceptible to unauthorized access.  This complexity also serves to make the 
network’s hard to secure. 
Hackers use different attack techniques to take advantage of HCO vulnerabilities and 
gain access to the network.  A common type of attack is a phishing scam conducted over email.  
Hackers send an authentic looking email to hospital staff and include a link or attachment that 
unsuspecting users open or click.  Once that content is activated, the hacker gains access to 
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the network and can get information or activate a malicious virus (Ayala, 2016).  Phishing scams 
are on the rise; there was a 789% increase in phishing e-mails from the last quarter in 2015 to 
the first quarter in 2016 (Becker’s Hospital Review, 2016 Jun).  A second type of attack is a 
malware attack, which is when malicious code or virus is dispatched within a computer network 
(Narayana Samy et al., 2010).  One example of malware attack that is of growing concern for 
healthcare organizations is ransomware.  In the HIMSS 2018 Cybersecurity Survey, 
respondents ranked perceived threats and ransomware is now second on the list (11.3%), 
whereas natural hazard (i.e. fire or flood) was eleventh on the list (8.3%) (HIMSS North 
America, 2018).     
 During a ransomware attack, bad actors will lock users out of a network and demand a 
ransom payment for the decryption key.  The first ransomware attack took place in 1989 when 
an AIDS researcher, Joseph Popp, sent 20,000 floppy disks to AIDS researchers in 90 
countries.  The floppy disks were said to contain a questionnaire to help determine patient’s risk 
of contracting AIDS.  When inserted, these disks infected the computer with a virus that lay 
dormant until the 90th time they were turned on.  Once the computer was booted for the 90 th 
time, a note would appear on the screen asking for licensing fees to be paid while locking the 
user out of the computer (Waddell, 2016).  Since 1989, ransomware attacks have continued and 
are now categorized as one of two types: scareware and crypto ransomware.  Scareware will 
inform a computer user there is something fatally wrong with their machine and offer a solution 
for a small payment.  Crypto ransomware is much more complex, in that it will encrypt computer 
files so that they need a certain decryption key to be opened.  These crypto-viruses have 
become a lot harder, and many times impossible, to break even by experts (Waddell, 2016).   
Similar to the first ransomware attack, hackers have again shifted their targets to the 
healthcare industry.  In healthcare, this type of attack can essentially shut down an 
organization’s ability to operate and provide patient care (Siwicki, 2017b).  In May 2017, a global 
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ransomware attack known as WannaCry was perpetrated by the North Korean government 
(Nakashima, 2018).  Hackers utilized a stolen National Security Agency (NSA) tool to gain 
access to 300,000 computers across 150 countries (Chappell & Neuman, 2017; Nakashima, 
2018).   During this attack, 36 health organizations, including hospitals, ambulance services, 
and physicians’ offices, in Great Britain were locked out of their systems (Perlroth & Sanger, 
2017).  WannaCry forced the National Health Service to send patients away from certain 
facilities in order to receive the care they needed (Perlroth & Sanger, 2017).  Homeland Security 
experts have said this attack directly put patients’ lives at risk (Chappell & Neuman, 2017). 
 This type of cyberattack against organizations has become more frequent in occurrence 
(Larson, 2017).  In April 2016, there was a 159% jump seen in ransomware attacks from the 
month before.  This was a huge rise from the normal 9-20% monthly increase that had 
previously been seen (Lee, May 2016).  In 2015, across all industries, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) reportedly received more than 2,500 ransomware complaints, which cost the 
victims $214 million (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016).  A 2016 IT report stated 
93% of phishing emails now contained ransomware (Becker’s Hospital Review, 2016 Jun).  In 
2018, the city of Atlanta fell victim to a ransomware attack and lost many of its critical municipal 
systems.  This attack alone cost the city $2.7 million to recover (Spitzer, 2018).   
 In February 2016, an outbreak of ransomware attacks against United States hospitals 
began at Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, California.  The hospital was 
offline for over a week before deciding to pay the ransom (Barrett, 2016).  Approximately 
$17,000 was paid and the hospital regained access to its operating systems (Winton, 2016).  
Since this initial attack, there has been a surge in reported malware attacks of healthcare 
providers across the United States.  These attacks can be extremely costly for HCOs (Reed, 
2016).  A hospital in New York was attacked in 2017 and it has been estimated that their 
recovery cost was almost $10 million, including hardware, software, extra staff hours, overtime 
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hours, and loss of business costs (Davis, 2017).  The on-going fixes and upgrades to the 
hospital system are estimated to be an additional $250,000 to $450,000 a month (Davis, 2017).  
In the most recent HIMSS Cybersecurity Survey, 75.7% of respondents reported a significant 
security incident in the past 12 months (HIMSS North America, 2018).   
 The best way for hospitals to protect themselves is to be proactive and take steps to 
strengthen their potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses.  Hospitals need to conduct risk 
assessments to better understand how large the risk malware attacks pose to their organization, 
as well as how big an impact successful attacks can have on operations.  Once they have a risk 
analysis of malware attacks, HCOs can decide which fixes to their system make the most sense 
financially to offer the most protection.   
 Lack of reliable reporting on frequencies and impact of this type of attack make it difficult 
for the healthcare industry to better secure their systems.  The risk reports that do exist do not 
expand on the nature and scope of these successful attacks.  Some of these incidents only 
affect a few computer terminals, whereas other incidents have a more significant impact on the 
organization and have the potential to affect patient care and safety.  Due to the inherent nature 
of hospitals and the initial ransom payment made by Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, 
these types of incidents are only expected to continue to grow in frequency.   
A recent study assessed trends in data breach reports to DHHS Office for Civil Rights 
Portal, which included data breaches caused by hacking or IT incident (McCoy and Perlis, 
2018).  However, this study was unable to identify which data breaches were linked to a 
malware or ransomware event, and not all ransomware or malware events result in a reportable 
data breach.  Currently, there are popular media reports on these types of attacks, but there is 
no methodology for consistently tracking hospital attacks over time.  This study seeks to 
address this gap by assessing the trend of malware attacks on HCOs over time.  This objective 
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will be achieved by reviewing publicly-reported, successful attacks on healthcare organizations 
within the United States between 2016 and 2017.  The final product of this analysis will be a 
timeline of reported ransomware attacks on hospitals, as well as a summary of what data is 
being reported with each attack.  A logic diagram will also be developed to show the process of 
a malware attack on an HCO.  Without a better understanding of this type of threat, healthcare 
organizations cannot adequately protect their organization or their patient’s safety (Narayana 
Samy et al., 2010). 
Methods 
A content analysis was conducted of news articles related to hospital malware attacks.  
The new sites Healthcare IT News and Becker’s Hospital Review were used as data sources.  
Healthcare IT News is a site published by Healthcare Information and Management Systems 
Society (HIMSS), and is one of the most comprehensive news sources for information on 
healthcare information technology.  Becker’s Hospital Review is another well-known and 
reputable source of information related to information technology in the field of healthcare. A 
search of these databases was conducted using a combination of the keywords “hospital” or 
“healthcare”, “malware” or “ransomware” and “attack”.  These articles were reviewed for 
relevance to the research question.  Inclusion criteria for articles were references to malware or 
ransomware attacks on hospitals or healthcare facilities within the United States during 2016 
and 2017.  Articles that discussed data breaches caused by hackers or misplaced hardware, as 
well as articles that discussed phishing scams were excluded from this analysis.   
 The included articles were analyzed to identify cases, which were then were formatted 
into timelines to summarize the number and locations of reported malware attacks.  Upon 
further investigation and research, each case was also reviewed for date of attack, name of 
facility or organization, location, how many facilities were affected, what the impact on the 
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facility was, and if any outcome was disclosed.  If the articles referenced a data breach, that 
information was cross referenced with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Office of Civil Rights Breach Report Database.  The HITECH Act requires that all data breaches 
impacting 500 or more individuals be reported in this database.  This data was put in to a table 
to summarize the extent of publicly-reported malware attacks on United States hospitals 
between 2016 and 2017, and to identify trends within this dataset. 
 A logic diagram was also created to illustrate a malware attack on a hospital network 
through a phishing attempt.  This diagram walks through the steps of a phishing ransomware 
attack in which a hacker gains access to the network.  The diagram was created using data 
collected during qualitative interviews with subject matter experts, including a Chief Information 
Officer, a Chief Information Security Officer, a Senior Network Administrator, and a Healthcare 
IT Manager.  It uses a hypothetical hospital to show the extent of a successful phishing attack, 
and the breadth of access to data and applications a hacker could potentially gain in to a secure 
network.   
Results 
Malware Attacks, United States 2016-2017  
Overall this study discovered 49 reported cases of malware attacks on U.S. Healthcare 
Organizations during 2016 and 2017.  Within the found instances, there were 22 malware 
attacks in 2016 and 27 malware attacks in 2017.  Figures 3 and 4 present these healthcare 
attack cases, respectively.    This analysis has shown attacks occur all over the country and 
take place all year long.  The data collected showed there were malware attacks on HCOs in 13 
states in 2016 and 20 states in 2017.  A map of the United States displaying frequency of 
malware attacks for both years is shown in Figure 5.  The state with the most attacks in this 
content analysis was California with 9 attacks across both years.  There were 10 additional 
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states that reported more than one attack and 16 states that experienced at least one attack 
across both years.  Both years had attacks reported in 9 different months.  The identified attacks 
are affecting more than just hospitals across the country.  One attack against a health system 
impacted 10 hospitals and 250 outpatient clinics in the D.C./Maryland region.  Another attack 
against a health system saw impacted hospitals across state lines. Some of the attacks only 
impacted one facility, but often that facility lost access to its medical record.   
Each of the 49 identified cases did not have the same impact to their respective 
healthcare organization.  Tables 1 through 4 present impact details of the identified malware 
attacks.  Forty-one of the cases were labeled as ‘ransomware’ attacks (shown in Table 1).  The 
articles reported that at least six organizations paid ransom (shown in Table 2).  In one case 
(Kansas Heart Hospital), the hospital paid ransom and the hackers released only a portion of 
their files before demanding a second ransom.  They did not pay the second ransom demand 
(Siwicki, 2016).  The other 43 cases did not disclose a payment to the press.  Some of the 
articles reported outage times for the organizations, which ranged from 1 day to about 2 weeks 
(show in Table 3).  The most frequent time offline that was reported was one week.  The first 
ransomware attack against a hospital, Hollywood Presbyterian, paid $17,000 after a stand-off 
with hackers and almost two weeks offline.  Another major impact identified was compromised 
patient or staff records.  Sixteen of the attacks reported no records breached.  Seventeen of the 
attacks reported less than 50,000 records impacted.  The highest number of records reported 
500,000 breached records, with three other attacks reporting more than 200,000 breached 
records (shown in Table 4).      
 One of the issues identified while completing this content analysis was the lack of 
consistency in reporting and defining this type of attack.  Across all identified cases, there were 
different search terms required to identify certain cases.  Table 5 shows the different terms that 
were required to find different cases.  Ten of the cases only showed up in searches using the 
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term “cyberattack”, eight only showed up using the term “malware”, and ten only showed up 
using the term “ransomware”.  The other 21 cases were identified using more than one of the 
listed search terms.  This lack in consistent reference words make it difficult to fully identify all 
reported cases.   
Logic Diagram 
 Due to the complexity of healthcare organizations, there are a few steps hackers must 
go through to gain access.  Figure 6 presents the steps as they would occur in an email 
phishing attack.  The attack begins when a hacker sends mass emails to employees within an 
organization attempting to get one employee to be deceived.  The email would either contain a 
malicious link or attachment within that would allow the hacker to gain shell credentials to the 
organization.  With these shell credentials, depending upon the level of access they have, the 
hacker can gain direct access to network applications or they can find another user credential 
who does have access.   
Once the hacker gains administrative or domain level access, they can permeate across 
the organization’s network to find the information they are looking for.  In this scenario, Figure 6 
shows the applications and confidential data the hacker would gain access to in this HCO.  The 
software applications include: timekeeping, imaging, medical scribing, catheter laboratory 
services, obstetrics and gynecology clinical services, the network email exchange and all 
organizational file shares.  From this access, the hacker has access to protected health 
information, proprietary business data, payroll information, and other confidential data, such as 
social security numbers of patients and staff members.   
If the hacker’s goal is to deliver a malicious payload, such as ransomware, the hacker 
can choose where to drop it once they gain access to the active directory enabled applications.  
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They can choose a location which would cause the biggest service disruption to increase 
likelihood the organization will pay the ransom demand.     
Once a hacker gains access to the HCO’s network, the HCO itself has limited options on 
how to stop access.  The first step is that the HCO must realize they have someone with 
malicious intent inside their network.  Often in the case of ransomware attacks this does not 
happen until applications stop working or a ransom note appears on desktops across the 
organization.  In cases like this, it is imperative the HCO shuts everything on the network down 
to stop the spread of the virus and to cut off the hacker’s access to the network.  This step 
would also cut off all users’ access to the network and cause a complete organization-wide 
downtime.   Once the network is shutdown, the HCO can conduct impact assessments to see 
how much damage has been done, if any, and can begin their recovery and business continuity 
processes.  If the HCO decides not to shut down the network, the hacker has continued access 
to the network and the virus can continue to spread infecting more hard-drives. 
Discussion 
 Over the last few years we have seen an increase in this trend of cyber targeting 
healthcare organizations.  This content analysis found 49 instances of malware attack on U.S. 
healthcare organizations during the years 2016 and 2017.  These attacks occurred across the 
county; with 27 states having a reported attack during the same period.  The attacks also impact 
all areas of healthcare delivery, including hospitals, primary care, outpatient clinics, medical 
suppliers, and electronic medical record providers.   
 With aspects of care delivery at risk, malware attacks are a threat to patient safety 
(Ayala, 2016).  The 49 attacks identified through this analysis had ranging levels of impact, but 
all were required to go offline for a period of time to stop the spread of the computer virus.  
Providing care without access to patient history can be hazardous.  For example, without the 
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system’s automated checks and balances in place while prescribing medications there is a 
chance that something in the patient chart gets overlooked.  Medical devices are also at-risk 
during malware attacks, including therapeutic equipment (infusion pumps), life-support 
equipment (ventilators), and diagnostic equipment (PET scanners).  Any of these devices can 
serve as backdoors in to healthcare networks if not secured.  One report reviewed three case 
studies where medical devices were used by hackers to break in and move through a network 
(TrapX Labs, 2015).   
Malware attacks can also affect patients and staff in ways other than through provision 
of healthcare services.  Attacks can have direct impacts on the facility itself, which potentially 
has downstream impacts on patient care.  At least one of the attacks from this analysis saw 
impacts to their security systems.  The hospital’s security cameras went offline, and they were 
forced to go in to lockdown until the cameras could be brought back online.  Another system 
potentially at risk is the HVAC system.  Without environmental temperature regulation, there is 
the possible need for evacuation of patients.  Finally, as seen in other cyberattacks, the 
electrical grid and water treatment are also potential targets (Naylor, 2018).  Without power or 
clean water, hospitals could no longer provide care and would also be required to move 
patients.  Evacuation of a hospital is an extreme undertaking with regard to staffing and 
resource needs as well as finding equivalent bed capacity to take patients.  An extreme 
example of the impact of power loss and evacuation on patient care was seen during Hurricane 
Katrina at Memorial Hospital where physicians decided which patients to save and hastened the 
death of others (NPR, 2013).   
This is the first known content analysis to develop a list of malware attacks across the 
healthcare industry.  One limitation of this research is the reliance on public reports of attacks.  
This analysis used two reputable healthcare IT databases to search for malware cases, 
however not all attacks are being reported.  Based on reports from the FBI and HIMSS, attacks 
42 
 
against healthcare are occurring much more frequently than found in this analysis.  The FBI 
urges HCOs to report attack, but ultimately this is left up to the discretion of the facility.  Attacks 
are only required to be reported when medical or financial information has been compromised.  
One reason for not reporting is HCOs do not want to risk their reputation or income by being 
labeled a victim.  This reporting loophole makes it much harder for the industry to get a clear 
picture of the attack trend (Evans, 2017).  Another limitation is the lack of consistency in reports 
of each attack.  This study tried to combat this inconsistency by using multiple search terms 
including ‘malware’, ‘ransomware’, and ‘cyberattack’.  With different terminology used in reports, 
there are potentially cases that are being reported but might not be captured by the content 
analysis.  Even with this limitation, the dynamic understanding provided through this content 
analysis will illustrate the frequency and types of cyberattacks as it has not been seen before in 
previous research.   
The sample of this analysis includes only successful attacks and no information was 
collected on attack attempts.  There are many more institutions who are vulnerable to attack, as 
well as organizations that experience daily attack attempts (HIMSS North America, 2018).  
There is a need for the healthcare industry to push for more public data regarding this hazard.  If 
attacks were reported to a single database, this information could be accessed in one location 
and used to better educate healthcare administrators on the risk cyberattacks pose to 
healthcare delivery and to business continuity.  This information could also be used to better 
develop a more accurate hazard vulnerability assessment (HVA) for HCOs.  A well-informed 
HVA is the basis for effective preparedness and response planning within emergency 
management.  
In 2018, this trend against the healthcare industry continues to grow.  As of September 
2018, there have been reported malware attacks every month of the year affecting health 
systems, hospitals, third-party medical suppliers, hospice care, provider clinics, and medical 
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device manufacturers.  Healthcare Organizations do have a few recommended actions they can 
take to protect their networks including developing a security culture within the organization.  It 
is recommended that HCOs teach safe-use habits to all staff and test on these rules.  There are 
also IT solutions to protect against cyberattacks, such as the use of strong firewalls, antivirus 
software, intrusion detection, and even limiting network access (TrapX Labs, 2015).  Another 
avenue HCOs can explore in preparing for cyber threats is procuring cyber insurance.  Costs of 
attacks are estimated to be in the trillions worldwide by 2020 (Siwicki, 2017a).  Cyber insurance 
is a way to protect the HCO enterprise.  Insurance companies will do a full assessment of an 
organization’s IT capabilities and offer differing levels of coverage for a price.  Often, insurance 
does not cover loss of revenue from downtime during attacks (Siwicki, 2017a).  As this type of 
threat continues to evolve, so too will cyber insurance policies.   
Cyber threats to our society are only expected to grow over time.  A 2017 article from the 
American Public Health Association cited a cyber-firm report which estimates over the next five 
years, cyberattacks would cost the United States Healthcare system $305 billion in revenue and 
these attacks would affect 1 in 13 patients (Krisberg, 2017).  There is a need for future research 
in this area to better define what happens within an HCO during an attack.  Further review of 
attack cases could highlight lessons learned and potentially lead to identification of best 
practices.  This research will help HCOs better understand this hazard to prepare for and plan 
for mitigation of this threat.  The healthcare industry has a choice to make when it comes to 
emergency preparedness, are they going to prepare their organizations to prevent threats from 
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Figure 5: Frequency of Malware Attacks in the United States, 2016-2017
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Table 1: Terminology Used to Describe Attack, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017 
Terminology 
2016 2017 Total (N = 49) 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Malware 5 22.73 3 11.11 8 16.33 
Ransomware 17 77.27 24 88.89 41 83.67 
 
Table 2: Ransom Payments, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017 
Payment Reported 
2016 2017 Total (N = 49) 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Yes 5 22.73 1 3.70 6 12.24 
No 17 77.27 26 96.30 43 87.76 
 
Table 3: Network/System Time Offline, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017 
Time Offline 
2016 2017 Total (N = 14) 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
1 day 0 0 2 33.33 2 14.29 
>3days 0 0 1 16.67 1 7.14 
>a week 3 37.5 0 0 3 21.43 
1 week 1 12.5 2 33.33 3 21.43 
2 weeks 1 12.5 0 0 1 7.14 
> 2 weeks 0 0 1 16.67 1 7.14 
3 weeks 1 12.5 0 0 1 7.14 
5 days 2 25 0 0 2 14.29 







Table 4: Number of Medical Records Impacted, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017 
Impact Range 
2016 2017 Total (N = 41) 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
0 7 43.75 9 36.00 16 39.02 
Less than 10,000 4 25.00 5 20.00 9 21.95 
10,000 to 50,000 5 31.25 3 12.00 8 19.51 
50,000 to 100,000 0 0.00 2 8.00 2 4.88 
100,000 to 200,000 0 0.00 2 8.00 2 4.88 
200,000 and Above 0 0.00 4 16.00 4 9.76 
Missing 6 - 2 - 8 - 
 
Table 5: Search Engine Terminology, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017 
 
Search Engine 
2016 2017 Total (N = 49) 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Cyber attack 2 9.09 8 29.63 10 20.41 
Malware 5 22.73 3 11.11 8 16.33 
Ransomware 6 27.27 4 14.81 10 20.41 
Ransomware / More than one 9 40.91 12 44.44 21 42.86 
54 
 











III. Chapter 3 
 
 
Cyberattacks Against Healthcare: Stakeholders’ Experiences with Organizational 




Lauren E. Branch1 
Warren S. Eller2 
Tom K. Bias3 
Michael A. McCawley1 
Douglas J. Myers1 




1Department of Occupational & Environmental Health Sciences, West Virginia University, 
Morgantown, WV 26506, USA 
2Department of Public Management, The City University of New York, New York, NY 10019, 
USA 
3Department of Health Policy, Leadership & Management, West Virginia University, 
Morgantown, WV 26506, USA 



















Introduction: Over the past three years, the healthcare industry in the United States has become 
a growing target for cyberattacks.  This type of attack can take an entire hospital network offline 
and has the potential to severely impact patient safety.  These cases often go unreported as the 
healthcare industry remains private about these incidents.  Shared data on frequency and 
impact occurring with these attacks could be used to identify best practices for healthcare to be 
better prepare and respond more effectively to this type of threat.    
 
Methods: A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with key stakeholders identified from 
three hospitals that have been victims of cyberattack.  Each hospital was represented by an 
administrator, an information technology specialist, and an emergency manager.  Content 
analysis was used to identify key themes related to cyberattacks against healthcare that 
emerged across multiple interviews.   
 
Results: All of the organizations interviewed experienced complete shutdowns of their network 
for varied amounts of time.  Two of the three organizations had to operate within incident 
command structure for over a month and did not fully recover for six months or more.  Both 
organizations estimated the cost of their incident to be around $10 million.  Due to the length of 
recovery and breadth of impact, representatives from each of the facilities felt this was the most 
challenging emergency they experienced during their time in healthcare.  One of the key themes 
that emerged from the interviews was the potential risk these threats pose to patient care 
without digital safeguards in place to ensure accurate data.  The bottom line in corporate 
healthcare was discussed as a barrier to being more prepared for cyber threats.  The American 
healthcare system has become a business where the profit margin matters and augmentations 
to the system must show good return on investment.            
 
Discussion: Participants in this study shared the malware attacks they experienced were not the 
ordinary emergency healthcare organizations prepare for, and these attacks are only expected 
to increase in frequency.  Investments need to be made to strengthen and secure the United 
States Healthcare digital environment. Organizations can educate staff to be more cyber-safe 
while accessing the system, they could invest in IT security solutions, or go as far as 
restructuring their network to keep critical functions walled off from the rest of the system.  With 













The first known ransomware attack on a United States hospital was in 2016 (Siwicki, 
2017).  Since this initial attack, the trend of targeting healthcare organizations (HCOs) for 
malware attacks has only grown.  A recent content analysis by the authors found 49 publicly 
reported attacks in 2016 and 2017.  Reports from authoritative organizations, such as the 
Health Information Management Systems Society (HIMSS) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI), claim these attacks are occurring much more frequently.  In the 2018 
HIMSS Cybersecurity Survey, 75.7% of respondents reported having a significant security 
incident in the past 12 months (HIMSS North America, 2018).  One reason the publicly reported 
numbers are so low is because hospitals are only required to report these attacks in instances 
where protected data has been breached.   
Cyberattacks against healthcare can have major impacts to the organization, as well as 
on patient care.  One major concern hospitals have are their reputations and the potential for 
loss of business during these attacks.  These incidents can cause patients to feel that they 
themselves or their information is not safe.  Data privacy is always an important topic in the 
healthcare industry and cyberattacks often put privacy at risk.  Healthcare Organizations are 
required to report a breach of data to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of 
Civil Rights Data Breach Portal, and this report becomes public when there are more than 500 
records breached (United States Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil 
Rights, 2016).  One issue that exists in the current system is the health organization itself 
determines whether records were accessed or breached (United States Department of Health 
and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2015).  With their reputation and patient privacy on 
the line, there is potential for organizations to make an error during the quick call to judgement 
on whether records were accessed.  Because hospitals often keep these incidents private, the 
attacks aren’t being properly recorded or shared across the industry.  Without reports, other 
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HCOs aren’t aware how frequently these attacks are occurring, what happens during these 
incidents or how hospitals are handling them.   
Another concern for HCOs is the impact to patient care these attacks can often have.  
Cyberattacks essentially shut down access to all or to parts of an Information Technology (IT) 
network.  At an HCO, cyberattacks can threaten patient care equipment, such as electronic 
medical records (EMRs), laboratory testing technology, medication dispensing machines, active 
medical devices (such as IV pumps), as well as facility maintenance equipment, such as 
security cameras or HVAC systems.  Without access to these tools, today’s environment of 
patient care changes dramatically.  In the current healthcare environment, an EMR stores all 
patient data and is information within a record is relied upon to make care decisions, including 
lab results, diagnosis information, and even allergy lists.  During a cyberattack, data from all of 
the above technologies can no longer be trusted as accurate.  Each system and all of its 
devices must be thoroughly inspected to make sure they have not been impacted.  These 
changes have the potential to put patient safety at risk through improper care delivery or 
incorrect medication dosing or even through the inability to properly regulate environmental 
temperatures.  This potential risk to patient safety is too high for the healthcare industry to 
continue keeping cyberattacks private. 
Previous analysis showed that not all HCOs who fall victim to cyberattack see the same 
effects on their organization.  Some facilities reported minimal impact to a few of their systems, 
whereas other facilities had to rebuild their entire network costing them millions of dollars.  To 
understand the true risk cyber threats pose to healthcare, it is important to know the full 
spectrum of their potential impact.  A more in-depth knowledge of previous attacks can be used 
to illustrate what happens to organizations under attack as well as to identify best practices for 
hospital preparedness and response.   
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The primary objective of this study is to examine the organizational best practices to 
mitigate the effects of and to re-establish business continuity after a malware attack.  Currently, 
recommended actions for HCOs are somewhat generic and lacking overall with how HCOs should 
prepare for and mitigate the impacts of an attack.  This study seeks to address this gap by 
assessing the organizational outcomes of a malware attack on healthcare organizations.  This 
objective will be achieved by first identifying key evaluation questions based on existing literature 
and conversations with subject matter experts. These questions will then be used to interview key 
stakeholders in healthcare cybersecurity, including representatives from healthcare IT, 
emergency management, and administration, to compare outcomes of three different facilities 
that were each victims of a malware attack. 
Methods 
A series of in-depth interviews was conducted with staff from three separate healthcare 
organizations to answer this aim’s research questions.  This qualitative approach was chosen to 
allow for a deeper understanding and help create an in-depth description of what happens 
within an organization during a ransomware attack (Cagliuso, 2014a; Creswell, 2007).   
Hospitals selected for this study had experienced a malware attack on their organization within 
the previous 2 years, and the interview subjects were employed at the HCO during the time of 
their attack.   
Interviews were conducted with three representatives from each healthcare organization.  
Each HCO was represented by an employee from each of the following stakeholder groups: 
hospital administrators, hospital safety/emergency preparedness coordinators, and health IT 
staff.  By interviewing individuals from different stakeholder groups, the data will provide a well-
rounded explanation of the phenomenon in question (Cagliuso, 2014a).  Hospital administrators 
oversee the clinical and operational aspects of the hospital, as well as serve as decision makers 
in the organization’s response (Cagliuso, 2014a; Cagliuso, 2014b; Healthcare IT News & 
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HIMSS Analytics, 2016).  Hospital safety/emergency preparedness coordinators ensure the 
organization meets the regulatory requirements for emergency preparedness.  Health IT staff 
ensure all IT equipment within the facility runs smoothly and securely.  The participants selected 
were key individuals in the response to their organization’s cyberattack.  Interview subjects will 
remain confidential and will only be identified by their stakeholder group.   
A semi-structured interview guide was developed using background information and 
research questions, including data collected from previous analysis and informal conversations 
that have occurred with hospital representatives.  The interview will consist of open-ended 
questions with probes to help elicit information from the interviewees.  Some of the topic areas 
covered in these interviews are recognition of the attack, impact of the malware on their system, 
an overview of their recovery efforts, preparedness efforts both before and after the attack, and 
whether there have been other attacks on their organization.  The interview guide can be found 
in the Appendices.  The interviews were conducted over a nine month period at times 
convenient to the participants.  Each interview was recorded and transcribed for analysis.   
Once the interviews took place, the transcripts were analyzed using content analysis.  
The purpose of content being analysis of documents, text, or speech to see what themes 
emerge from the data (Krippendorff, 1989).  The data was read all the way through prior to the 
analysis being conducted.  Multiple read throughs as well as techniques such as memoing and 
marking were used to help identify themes across the nine interviews (Creswell, 2007). Some 
key descriptions of what the stakeholders experienced are included in the paper to help 
illustrate the emerging themes (Cagliuso, 2014b).  
Results 
 This study explored the lived experiences of nine stakeholders in healthcare 
cybersecurity.  Interview questions 1-4 collected demographic information, while questions 5-9 
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examined issue salience and situational awareness.  Questions 10-19 elicited descriptions of 
system impact, business recovery, and organizational preparedness.  The results are displayed 
in three sections: participant description of the attack and its impact on their organization, the 
identified themes across interviews, and organizational actions taken to be more prepared. 
Quotes from participants are included to provide individual descriptions of the experiences 
discussed.  The mean length of time for interview was 41 minutes.   
Characteristics of the healthcare organizations are summarized in Table 1.  Two of the 
facilities interviewed are Level One Trauma Centers, and the other facility is an acute care 
hospital.  The average bed count between all three facilities is 509 beds.  The first set of 
questions regarded participant demographics.  This data has been summarized in Table 2.  
Each organization was represented by two males and one female.  The average years in career 
field was 11.4 years.  Highest level of education completed ranged from an Associate’s Degree 
to a Doctor of Medicine, with the most common level seen across participants being a Master’s 
Degree.  
Each healthcare organization experienced a malware attack between 2016 and 2017.  
Two of the organizations’ incidents were ransomware attacks, where the hackers asked for a 
ransom payment to unlock their networks.  Both of these hospitals reported not making the 
ransom payment.  The other organization reported originally seeing a ransom note on their PCs 
which quickly disappeared, and the organization realized this was a malware attack rather than 
a ransomware attack.  The hacker’s primary goal in this organization’s incident was system 
damage.   
While discussing the details of each organization’s attack, some similarities started to 
become apparent.  One characteristic each organization identified as helping their response and 
mitigation was the quick recognition of the incident by information technology (IT) staff.  Each 
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organization realized they were infected with a virus when employees called their IT desk and 
reported issues with accessing certain computer applications.  The IT staff member at each 
organization realized what was occurring and shut down their network.  Hospital A expressed 
how important it was for their IT staff to have the authority to make this call on their own.    A 
rapid shutdown of the network can stop the lateral spread of the virus across the system and 
essentially ‘stop the bleeding’ in terms of system impact.  The Emergency Manager from this 
facility expressed how impactful this was for their organization: 
 “Our IT folks…they have the autonomy…that if they noticed something that's 
hanky, they don't have to pick up the phone and call somebody and get 
permission to lock things up and to protect us. They have the ability that the 
minute they see something that's weird, they can essentially lift the plastic, hit the 
red button and let folks know after the fact that…something's up. So…that was a 
saving grace for us.” 
Even though each organization’s quick recognition and reaction to the attack, there were 
still different lengths of impact and business recovery.  The shortest impact was Hospital C 
which was back to normal business in about seven or eight days.  Whereas Hospital A and 
Hospital B had their incident command teams activated for over a month and were not back to 
normal operations for six months.  These facilities were required to rebuild their entire networks 
which was extremely time consuming and costly.  This rebuilding of a network entails cleaning 
or replacing each PC, each hard drive, and each piece of equipment on the network; meaning 
for most of these facilities thousands of hard drives had to be cleaned or replaced.  Both 
Hospital A and Hospital B shared in their interviews that the network rebuild cost more than $10 
million.  This cost of impact includes equipment costs, increased hours by salaried employees, 
and business interruption costs.  The length of impact between hospitals differed because of 
how far-reaching the virus was through their networks.  Forensic investigations revealed the 
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attackers had been in the organizations’ networks prior to the activation of the malware virus.  
All facilities interviewed said the virus was believed to have been in the system anywhere from a 
couple of hours prior to activation up to 24 hours prior to activation.  Hospital A did report the 
hackers had been in their system the week before the attack, most likely mapping out the 
hospital network.  Additional time in the system allows hackers to find the most detrimental 
location within the network to deploy the malware virus.  The goal in a ransomware attack is to 
cripple an agency so they feel their only way out is to deliver the ransom payment.   
The length of impact was defined by how far-reaching the virus was within the 
healthcare system, and as a result by how many applications were affected.  Two of the 
hospitals saw complete shutdowns during their attacks.  The Administrator from Hospital A said,  
“everything was absolutely cutoff.”  The Emergency Manager from Hospital B illustrated this 
point a bit further,  
“Every computer system in the organization was taken out with one exception of 
a security computer that regulated electronic door locks and electronic badge 
access to the actual main campus.” 
 When questioned for more details regarding applications that went down during the 
attack, all interviews mentioned patient care, business, and facility management applications 
were impacted.  Hospitals A and B lost access to their electronic medical records (EMRs).  
Hospital C did not have the virus infect their EMRs itself, however they had issues with 
supporting applications to the EMR taking it offline for a period.  Each facility was forced to go 
back to pen and paper records for a period of time, which will be discussed more below.  These 
records included patient charting, medication orders, laboratory results, and radiology results.  
Radiology was highlighted by all facilities as being a heavily impacted department, noted 
because of how technology reliant they are.  Hospital A was forced to go back to printing films 
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and having a radiologist in house to read films and dictate results.  All three facilities also 
reported seeing impacts in the Pharmacy department.  Each facility was forced to fill orders by 
hand and had issues accessing their medication dispensing devices.  Scheduling was another 
piece of patient care that was affected at Hospitals A and B.  All schedules for patient 
appointments, operations, etc. are kept electronically and were not available during the attack.    
 One the business side of the house, there were effects seen on the revenue processes.  
First, billing is done electronically and when that went down Hospital A was unable to bill out or 
accept payments for almost two months.  The Administrator said: 
“We couldn’t pull any data…So revenue-wise it was a real problem. … We 
couldn’t bill out…bills were coming in, but we couldn’t see them.” 
Another revenue-impacting application that was affected was the timekeeping system at both 
Hospital A and B.  Hospital A was forced to go back to paper timecards to track employee 
hours.  Due to the attack occurring so close to pay day, they also were unsure what was owed 
to each of their employees.  For that billing cycle, they opted to pay employees what they were 
paid on their previous paycheck and to reconcile these payments once the system was back up 
and running.  Another huge impact seen at all the facilities was loss of email.  As pointed out by 
the Administrator from Hospital B, “No email whatsoever, imagine in today’s world, no email…it 
was devastating.” 
 Secondary systems were also lost in the attacks.  The IT representative from Hospital B 
explained it as,  
“It was little side things that you assume will work no matter what, suddenly were 
down.”   
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At their facility, they were unable to take credit card payments in their cafeteria.  They also had 
a tube system through their facility that wasn’t functioning properly.  Hospital C reported issues 
seen with their sterile processing for endoscopies.  Other applications were impacted simply 
because the network was down, meaning they were operational but had no network to talk to 
and nowhere to deliver their data.  The IT representative from Hospital A illustrated this point by 
saying,  
“Modalities were working but only in isolation…without the network, they're 
essentially deaf, dumb and blind. You had to figure out how to do everything from 
the device itself.” 
Finally, there were varying impacts seen to security systems and HVAC systems, which will be 
discussed more in the following section. 
Themes   
A few key themes emerged from the participant narratives.  Below is a discussion of 
these themes, as well as a few key quotes from participants to help illustrate their experiences.  
Theme 1: Risk, risk everywhere 
 One of the topics discussed in almost every interview was how common this threat has 
become for the healthcare industry.  The administrator from Hospital B said, “this is a constant 
continuous threat to all healthcare organizations.”  The Emergency Manager from Hospital C 
shared how concerned he is about keeping his organization prepared against cyber threats,   
 “What frightens me is the sheer volume of cyberattacks that we see on a daily 
basis, coming through the hospitals.  That volume is alarming, and any one of 
those things could get out of control and cause problems. It's a constant threat. 
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…my fear is that it's going to just keep occurring and the frequency and the 
expansiveness of it at a facility or facilities plural [will increase].” 
Each facility acknowledged they’ve had attack attempts on their organization since their major 
attack.  Hospital B’s IT representative said, “We have attacks daily, but none of them have 
penetrated our defenses since then.”  
Representatives from all facilities also expressed concern for the ability to keep hackers 
out of their systems.  Multiple interviewees pointed out the race that exists between IT 
professionals and hackers to build more secure walls and to break down the security measures, 
respectively.  The hackers look at this as a business and are constantly working to find ways to 
get around security features.  The threat is continuously evolving, and IT professionals must 
stay aware of these almost daily changes in their field to remain secured.  The Administrator for 
Hospital C expressed his concern for this evolution,       
“It is perpetual and just because what you did was effective yesterday or even 
today has no bearing on whether or tomorrow. …So, we remain vulnerable.” 
 
Another major concern expressed was how little is understood or shared about cyber 
threats in healthcare.  The stakeholders felt that having more concrete information about this 
threat would provide a path forward for them.  The Emergency Manager of Hospital C said,  
“I don't know that there's …a true risk assessment that's been done to 
understand the impact [to] operations from a malware or cyberattack.” 
Another participant (IT from Hospital A) expressed similar thoughts below,  
“There seems to be nobody collecting or willing to communicate exactly how 
much damage is actually occurring out there.” 
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The participants felt with more data, they would be better equipped to prove how large of a risk 
this is and provide solutions that offer good return on investment.  These stakeholders are 
dissatisfied with existing solutions, as well as the secrecy and the privacy between healthcare 
organizations.  Currently, they feel the best way to protect their organization is to be better than 
the next organization.  The IT representative from Hospital A expressed his approach below,    
“I don't think there's any way you can totally prevent them, but if they find it 
difficult to attack you, they're going to move onto the next person. Which to me is 
a sad statement to the state of healthcare security in this country because my 
primary defense is make sure I'm stronger than the next person.  And you know, 
that doesn't make me feel good.”  
If HCOs were more open about being attacked, that information could be used to more clearly 
define what happens during these attacks and identify best practices for preparing 
organizations.  This shared belief was a major reason why these three organizations agreed to 
be part of this study.   
Theme 2: Realization of how connected we are in today’s healthcare delivery environment 
 While all participants have worked in healthcare for years, they have each seen the 
healthcare industry evolve from one of paper records and orders to an almost completely digital 
environment.  Even with this knowledge of the digital world they live in, most stakeholders 
expressed the shock that came during the attack realizing how connected their facility was and 
how many processes in their field have become automated.  The Administrator from Hospital C, 
who is also a clinician, expressed his shock at realizing how technology dependent his 
organization has become in the following two quotes. 
“Frankly, I don't know that outside of IT we gave it enough due prior to that until 
we realized how truly dependent we were on the tech functions that go on in the 
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background. The example that I use when explaining it to other folks is, we were 
unable to appropriately wash and sterilize endoscopes because of the malware 
attack. You wouldn't think that you could, that somebody affecting the computer 
would keep you from being able to do a colonoscopy.” 
 
“You know, if [our Electronic Medical Record] goes down, we can't check a blood 
sugar. … Because our glucometers are set up that they work after scanning a 
patient ID so that they will automatically input the value into that patient's chart. 
So if you can't scan the patient's ID, because [the EMR] won't receive the 
function, you can't check the blood sugar.” 
Another major realization that occurred during their attacks was how many different applications 
were being utilized across their organization.  One of the first steps of the response was 
creating a list of the applications impacted and then prioritizing them on critical function.  During 
this process in each organization, there were applications brought up that people in the 
command center had no idea what they were or who was using them.  The Emergency 
Manager from Hospital A shared, “I don't think any of us realized just how many separate, 
different programs that we actually had.”  Not only was this an issue with response, but each 
application on the network poses additional security risk to the organization.  The Administrator 
for Hospital A shared this was a question when reloading applications, asking whether the 
application was necessary and worth the additional risk.  She shared that not all applications 
were reloaded on to the network.   
One facet of security risk brought up by the IT stakeholders was healthcare’s 
dependence on third party’s security.  Today’s healthcare environment uses different software 
applications to conduct care delivery and business operations.  Most of the applications 
discussed above come from third party vendors.  Once the application is purchased, it is often 
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put on the hospital’s network, and if that application is not up to date with security, it can serve 
as a potential route of entry in to the organization’s entire network.  One of the IT stakeholders 
expressed this by saying,  
 “I still think there's an issue in healthcare… it's one of the few environments I 
can think of that it's the inside software systems, the mechanical systems and 
everything are managed and created by different organizations…companies that 
really don't look at security as our primary goal.” 
One of the other IT participants expressed his concern on this topic saying, 
“We need to gear up and check and make sure all these vendors making these 
medical devices understand the full impact of their role in preventing this.” 
 
Theme 3: What’s at stake with patient safety and environment of care  
 A big concern in healthcare is always data privacy, and during a cyberattack that 
becomes a major concern.  An unwanted party has accessed a private network and potentially 
accessed any number of private records, including patient health or employee personnel.  
Hospital A spent months investigating to make sure there was no Private Health Information 
(PHI) was breached.   
 One of the first questions asked during each of these cases was ‘how does this impact 
patient care?’  In each of these cases, the organizations were able to continue care for the 
patients on hand.  One of the facilities put their Emergency Room on diversion until they were 
able to get a better handle of the situation.  Another facility had to cancel some surgeries 
scheduled for that day.  Also, as discussed previously most of the normal digital processes for 
providing care were inaccessible to providers and there had to be work arounds put in place.  
Without the usual system safeguards in place and the large number of younger employees who 
reported not knowing how to switch back to paper charts and orders, there becomes increased 
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chance of error with provision of care.  The hospitals in this study felt they could provide safe 
care for most of their patients, but they were unsure whether they could rely on the patient data 
they had.  There was a huge concern expressed by more than one facility that health data they 
had for each patient was potentially no longer reliable.  They worried patient charts or test 
results were compromised and realized how detrimental that could be when making care 
decisions.  One of the IT stakeholders expressed his thoughts on the topic,  
“Also [the importance of making sure] that the integrity of the data is solid, this is 
health data for patients. Doctors and physicians and clinical staff are running with 
this data and providing care and that data is not solid. We can be doing really 
serious harm to the patient.” 
Another issue regarding patient care that was mentioned by the facilities was the use of 
medical devices, such as I.V. pumps.  While participants all reported no impacts seen to 
medical devices at their facilities, they still had concern.  A few mentioned they had read articles 
about the potential for active medical devices to be impacted by cyberattacks, and how there is 
proof that medical devices have been hacked before.  The reason these facilities did not see 
impact to their medical devices was due to the devices being off-network or due to the virus not 
making it to that part of their network.  One of the IT participants made this comment about his 
facilities’ I.V. pumps,   
“Yes, they are on my network. The models that I have, have not been associated 
with any attack, but that's not to say that that won't come today, tomorrow, next 
week.” 
 Another effect seen during these attacks which can potentially impact the patient care 
environment are the facility management functions.  The security systems and HVAC systems 
both saw impacts across these three organizations.    Two of the facilities reported issues with 
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their security systems.  One facility reported their badge readers going down for a short time.  
The other facility reported having issues with their security cameras.  One of the participants 
said this about their security cameras,  
“There was concern that we were not able to view our security cameras. So 
pretty much we were blind looking out into areas… [such as] entry points and 
other high-risk security areas that we would normally use video cameras to 
monitor.” 
Ensuring a secure environment is essential to providing safe care, and without the ability to 
control access to the facility or certain areas of the facility patients and staff are potentially put at 
risk.  Both issues were made a priority and resolved quickly.   
 The third facility noted the attack had an impact to their HVAC system.  The organization 
lost the automated controls of the system and had to monitor the environment, as well as make 
any adjustments by hand.  A representative from that facility discussed this effect below,  
“The plant operations team actually went around and manually monitored that 
during our time period. They would do… hourly or daily checks to make sure 
everything was up and running and if they needed to tweak it, they did it by 
hand.” 
If the proper temperature cannot be maintained or ventilation becomes an issue, the facility may 
have to consider evacuating patients.  For these three facilities, with a combined average of 
over 400 beds each, this would not be a simple task and moving certain types of patients could 
cause major health complications.  The other two facilities reported they did not see impacts to 
their HVAC systems because one system was too old to be on the network and the other was 
on its own network.   
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Theme 4: This is not a normal healthcare emergency  
 One thing that became very apparent throughout the interviews was these malware 
attacks were unlike any other emergency healthcare organizations normally face.  Reasons 
given in support of this statement were the length of time it took to recover, as well as the extent 
of impact seen across each organization.  One of the Administrators expressed this sentiment 
by saying, 
 “This was by far the most far reaching and devastating event I've ever been 
involved with in all my years of being in healthcare.” 
An Emergency Manager from a different organization expressed similar sentiments saying,  
“The challenge, the one thing that took the wind out of our sails was not so much 
the scope of what happened but the length of what happened. We operated in 
incident command mode for pretty much a month….this is not the typical disaster 
that a hospital faces….But this magnitude and this duration is what sets this 
apart.” 
 
Sometimes this type of threat is compared to downtime at a healthcare facility, where a 
piece of the system or applications go down.  This happens often at hospitals where the IT team 
sets up a scheduled downtime while they deploy a security patch or sometimes when something 
goes wrong with an application.  Hospitals prepare for these downtimes by pre-establishing 
downtime procedures that most staff are comfortable with.  This type of event though is very 
different than a normal hospital downtime because during cyberattacks these facilities lost 
access to everything.  Each of the organizations interviewed expressed their assumption that 
they would only lose one or two things at a time, and that in hindsight they realized how 
unprepared they were to function without access to anything.  An Administrator pointed out:  
“We had a lot of assumptions that not everything would ever go down at once.” 
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The Emergency Manager from another organization said,  
“We were not used to losing all of it at the same time, and that's what created the 
issues. We have plans for the loss of [each] thing that was impacted and we 
have lost everything that was impacted at one time or another, but to have lost all 
at the same time was the challenging part.” 
Another issue that arose at two of the facilities based on this assumption was their downtime 
procedures were stored electronically.  They expected to always have some working computers 
or printers but had ended up having none during their initial response.  Luckily, they were able 
to find ways around this by having a few paper copies or a laptop that had been completely 
unconnected from the network at the time of attack.     
Theme 5:  Tenured staff were our heroes 
 An unexpected theme that emerged during the interviews was how essential tenured 
staff was to the organizational response and recovery from the attack.  This theme was 
mentioned by at least one stakeholder from all three facilities.  The participants explained that 
staff who had been in healthcare longer were able to shift back to pen and paper records much 
easier than newer staff.  This group of individuals had experience with paper charting during 
their careers.  In contrast, the participants mentioned the hard time that younger staff had with 
switching back to paper charts.   The Emergency Manager from Hospital A expressed,  
“In some cases, it was kind of humorous, a lot of the newer younger clinicians, 
whether it's nurses, whether it's physicians, they are so acclimated to doing 
everything in the electronic realm.” 
The tenured staff were able to show the younger generations how to do things without 
access to the network.  All the participants who mentioned this topic were thankful they 
had experienced staff there who had knowledge of paper charting.  The IT stakeholder 
from Hospital B shared her experience seeing this phenom happen during their attack,  
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“That's where it was really interesting where some of the employees that had 
worked in healthcare long before we had the electronic arena, they were able to 
help many of the team members who had basically grown up with electronic 
[health record]... They were able to show them, there's other ways you can do 
the same thing.” 
Organizational Preparedness  
The final section of the interview involved questions related to organizational 
preparedness.  Topics covered in this portion of the interviews included barriers that 
exist to being more prepared for cyber events and best practices to better preparing an 
organization for cyber threats.   
When asked about barriers to being more prepared, there were three main topics the 
participants mentioned.  The first barrier they felt exists to being more secure in healthcare is 
the complexity of an IT network itself.  As discussed above, health systems are made up of 
applications and products that are developed by third parties.  Each health system is also 
different from one another.  This complexity makes it hard to keep each piece of the puzzle 
secured.  One of the administers point out,  
“There's no uniformity, and so that tremendous amount of variation in what is 
used and the particular brands and the particular versions. There's such variation 
that there is no one size fits all and I think that makes it much harder to be able to 
prepare for this and to prevent it from happening.” 
Another barrier discussed was one often seen in Healthcare Preparedness, limited funds 
and limited time (Cagliuso, 2014b).  There are a lot of IT solutions that could all be implemented 
at a facility to make it as secure as possible, however each of these solutions comes with an 
associated cost.  Most healthcare organizations are not able to spend unlimited amounts of 
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money on IT solutions.  There also needs to be a lot of time spent to thinking of solutions and on 
education of staff.  One of the administrators pointed out,  
“Organizations do not have the money to do everything they want to do to 
prevent this from happening and to do all of the education that needs to happen 
on a continual basis in order to help prevent a future.” 
Often smaller healthcare facilities do not have a full-time emergency manager, but rather 
add this as a supplemental duty to another job.  This was a topic brought up by one of the level-
one trauma centers while considering their neighboring hospitals.     
 Along with limited funds affecting the ability to purchase IT solutions, so too does 
healthcare organizations being run as businesses.  The bottom line or profit margin are 
important to these organizations, and there is the need to prove wanted solutions will provide 
good return on investment.  This was expressed by a few different participants.  While 
administrators feel it is important to invest in security, they also express that return on 
investment is essential.  The emergency managers expressed their feelings that there is not 
enough data out there to effectively illustrate the vulnerabilities in healthcare.  One of them also 
expressed his interest to frame the risk these cyber threats pose to revenue streams within the 
organization to get more administrators on board with costly IT solutions.   
“I do think we dedicate a fair portion of resources to cybersecurity….we could 
probably spend substantially more. The tough part is, you know, everything when 
it comes to resources is, you know, you have to make risk benefit decision.” 
Hospital executives from all departments must agree the cost of what’s at stake during cyber-
emergencies, i.e. patient care, private data, and business reputation, are all too much of a risk 




 Due to each of these facilities experiences with cyberattack, they made investments of 
both time and money to improve their security systems.  One of the first things mentioned by 
facilities was the general security practices, such as more frequent password changes and use 
of two-factor authentication.  One of the facilities went as far as not giving system access back 
to many employees.  They reevaluated who needs access to their network to complete their 
daily assignments and only gave accounts to individuals who needed them.  These 
organizations have also questioned which applications are essential to their providers.  
Applications that were providing duplicate functions or were not deemed essential were not 
restored in the system.     
Another change made by the facilities was restructuring their networks.  One facility 
created a tier structure for their applications.  Tier zero is a level someone must be physically in 
the building to gain access to and contains highly sensitive applications.  Tier one contains 
applications, such as the EMR and clinical data.  Individuals can gain remote access to this tier 
but must go through the upgraded security features listed above.  This tier structure has one-
way traffic, so individuals can only go down the tiers to access data but cannot travel up to 
higher levels without access.     
An additional investment in network security made by all three facilities was more 
education and training for staff members on how to be secure.  This training includes advice for 
safe-cyber practices in both the professional and personal realm and is held during new staff 
orientations.  One hospital mentioned also conducting department specific training on cyber 
security as a follow-up.  All three organizations run phishing drills with their staff where a fake 
phishing email is sent out with a link to see how many staff members click the link.  In the cases 
where staff members click on the link, some type of continued education is provided to reiterate 
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to them the importance of being cautious when clicking links or opening attachments.  The 
organizations also made changes to their downtime procedures to resolve some of the issues 
discussed above.  They keep paper copies of downtime forms, and at least one of the facilities 
has held a table-top drill to practice their new downtime procedures. 
Finally, the participants discussed more drastic measures their organizations have taken 
to be more prepared for additional cyber threats.  One of the HCOs developed an IT specific 
Incident Command Team.  This team consist of a broad background of IT professionals who will 
respond quickly to mitigate another potential attack.  If there is a question of another incident 
occurring, they will investigate and have the authority to immediately shut the network down if 
they feel it is necessary.  The other two facilities discussed their use of cyber insurance.  This is 
a specific type of insurance organizations can get to protect themselves if an attack does 
happen.  Both HCOs had their insurance prior to their attack and discussed the insurance firms 
sending cyber-representatives to help with the mitigation and recovery.  This is an avenue that 
some HCOs may be interested in and financially able to pursue, but it should not be the only 
solution for HCOs in preparing cyber threat.  These healthcare attacks are only expected to 
increase in frequency over the next few years and with patient safety and data is on the line, 
HCOs need to invest in prevention and preparedness for their networks.   
Discussion 
 Data collected through stakeholder interviews document the experiences of healthcare 
organizations responding to and recovering from a successful malware attack.  There were 
similarities among the organizations’ cyberattacks but there were also many differences.  Each 
organization is unique in its own complex way and learning more details about attacks against 
healthcare can help educate the industry on what risk the threat poses.  Each facility highlighted 
their information technology staff’s quick response time to reported issues and their decision to 
shut everything down as essential to minimizing the viral impact on the network.  While the 
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malware did cause large impacts across each network, none of these cases suffered data 
breaches.  All three organizations agreed this incident was unlike any other healthcare 
emergency they’ve handled before.  A malware attack is different in both its length and breadth 
of impact.  The participating organizations operated in incident command for an extended time, 
which is not a normal routine for healthcare facilities.  A normal emergency for healthcare 
usually lasts a few hours to potentially a few days; in two of the cases their recovery efforts took 
months.  Each organization also stated their scale with regard to downtime procedures was 
incorrect.  Their system and their staff were not prepared to lose everything at one time and to 
be disconnected from all digital applications for an extended time.   The participating facilities 
acknowledgment their younger generation staff members not knowing pen and paper 
procedures and highlighted a gap that is taking place within the current healthcare educational 
environment.  It is essential for staff to understand these procedures to ensure safe care and 
curriculum in all healthcare education need to include this information.  The attack made clear 
how dependent on technology healthcare delivery has become.   
Another topic discussed by participants was the strategy to ‘just be better’ than the next 
facility within healthcare security.  This approach assumes hackers are hitting certain facilities 
and give up on that organization when they can’t break in to the network.  The attack campaigns 
are more random, and hackers send out numerous attempts to separate facilities at one time to 
see where they can get through.  The attackers may then make changes to their code and could 
potentially send this new attempt out to the same facilities.  As one of the administrators pointed 
out in their interview, just because a healthcare organization’s defense worked today does not 
mean it will work tomorrow.  This safety strategy boils down to passing the buck and is a faulty 
strategy for healthcare organizations to rely on to keep their organizations secure and their 
patients safe.  Passing the buck on safety often leads to bigger disasters down the road 
(Barnier, 2011).  It is not enough for safety programs to be the absence of bad things happening 
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but must be the presence of a plan or preparedness actions in place to prevent the attack from 
occurring.  Through this experience, the three HCOs determined investments needed to be 
made to their IT security, to their staff training and awareness, and to their preparedness and 
response plans. 
This study provided valuable insight in to hospitals’ experiences during malware attacks.  
One limitation of this research lies in the nature of the topic itself.  The healthcare industry is 
very private about these attacks due to patient care concerns and business reputation concerns.  
Stakeholders from each of the three facilities expressed the idea that more openness across 
healthcare regarding cyber threats is essential to being a better prepared and a more secure 
industry.  Even with this belief, there is still the potential that the participants kept some aspects 
of their organizational experience private.  Federal regulations similar to CMS Emergency 
Preparedness Rule or DHHS data breach reporting rule may be needed to open the industry up 
and gain access to important data.  A central repository for data on malware attacks against 
healthcare would be vital to understanding the risk these threats pose.  Until the industry is 
more open with information, studies like this may not be getting the full picture of actions 
healthcare organizations are taking to be prepared.  Another potential limitation with this study is 
the interviews were all conducted more than a year after the incident in question.  This lag of 
time from the organizational attack and recovery efforts to the interview could have potentially 
introduced bias in to the data.  One observation made while analyzing the interview transcripts 
was not all the stakeholders from a facility reported the same experiences, but it was unclear 
whether these differences came from recall bias or from privacy concerns related to the 
incident.  A few of the participants were able to pull documents from the time of the incident to 
confirm facts they were stating.  A final limitation with this study is the data collected during 
these interviews may not be generalizable to all cyberattacks against healthcare in the United 
States.  There are many different types of cyberattacks, and each attack is its own unique case 
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dependent on the type of attack and how far a virus permeates a network.  In the previous 
content analysis by the authors, it was reported that six organizations reported making a ransom 
payment to end their attack.  This was not always the case, but one could assume their 
experiences were much different than the ones described in this study.  The data collected in 
this study is still vital to understanding what happens during a malware attack against a hospital 
and how that hospital responded.               
 Cyberattacks against healthcare facilities are only expected to continue to increase in 
frequency.  In 2017, the healthcare industry became the most popular target for breach attempts 
(Columbus, 2018).  It is clear based on the previous content analysis that most of these attacks 
go unreported.  The participants of this study expressed the need for solid data on number of 
attacks as well as on the impact being seen across the industry from cyberattacks.  Because the 
data is not being reported, there is not a central public database housing this information similar 
to the public database for healthcare data breaches.  This study provides a detailed explanation 
of the impacts seen during three separate cyberattacks.  Impacts could be seen with business 
administration, patient care, and environmental regulation.  The accuracy of patient data used to 
make care decisions was a major concern for all the facilities during the attack.  If this data had 
not been accurate, grave errors could have been made.  Another growing concern in healthcare 
security is targeting of active medical devices.  While none of the facilities interviewed saw 
impacts to their medical devices, one of the facilities does have I.V. pumps connected to their 
network that could have been infected with malware.  If medical devices become infected, 
hackers could change medication dosage information or hold individual patients’ lives hostage 
while demanding ransom from the organization (Ayala, 2016).   
 There is limited research on these attacks; a 2017 literature review on the topic found 
only 31 articles, most of which were news articles (Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 
2017).  An article from the American Public Health Association estimates that cyberattacks will 
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cost the United States Healthcare system an estimated $305 billion in revenue over the next five 
years (Krisberg, 2017).  As highlighted in the interviews, showing the return on investment is 
essential to gaining buy-in from those at the top.  As one of the administrators said, “Making it 
relevant to the individual is what matters. Not making it relevant to the organization. I think like 
many organizations, you have a lot of priorities that compete to be first, only one thing can be 
top priority.”  With patient safety and the environment of care at risk, let’s hope the top priority 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Hospital Demographics 
Hospital 
Name 
Type of Hospital Level of Care Location* Range of Beds 
A Medical Center Level One Trauma  Urbanized Area More than 300 
B Community Hospital Acute Care  Rural Between 100 and 300 
C Medical Center Level One Trauma  Urban Cluster More than 300 
*Location Classification based on United States Census Bureau: Urbanized Areas have population over 
50,000 ; Urban Clusters have population between 2,500 and 50,000 ; Rural Areas have less than 2,500.  




















Table 2: Participant Demographics 




1 Α Administrator Chief Quality Officer F 10 Masters 
2 𝐴 IT Chief Information 
Security Officer 
M 15 Associates 
3 𝐴 Emerg Mgmt Emergency Manager M 14 Registered  
Nurse 
4 𝐵 Administrator V.P. Patient Care 
Services 
F 7 Masters 
5 𝐵 IT Director of IT Systems M 10 Masters 
6 𝐵 Emerg Mgmt Emergency 
Preparedness 
Coordinator 
M 10 Registered  
Nurse 
7 𝐶 Administrator Chief Operating 
Officer 
M 8 Doctor of 
Medicine  
8 𝐶 IT Chief Information 
Security Officer 
F 3 Masters 
























Appendix 2: Interview Protocol 
Date: _______________                         Time: ___________ (Start)   ____________ (End) 
Interviewer: ___________________________           Interviewee: _____________________________ 
Thank you for agreeing to take time out of your schedule to meet with me to discuss your organizations response to and recovery 
from a malware attack.  Your personal and organizational involvement in this project will be kept as confidential as legally possible.  All data 
will be reported in aggregate.  IRB approval has been obtained for this project, and a copy of approval can be provided upon request.  You have 
been provided an informational cover letter via email to further explain this research project.  If you wish to continue with the interview, please 
reply with a verbal ‘yes’.  
 Interviewee Consented 
 Interviewee Did Not Consent.  The Interview is Over.   
Just a note before we get started, it is okay if you do not know the answer to some of these questions.  Also, please don’t feel like 
you have to answer every question.  If there is a question you don’t know or don’t feel comfortable answering, please let me know 
and we will skip to the next question. 






Department: Administration, Information Technology, 
Emergency Management 
Gender: Male, Female, Other 
How long have you been in this field? 





What field did you work in prior to this? 
A degree program? Any special certifications? 










Is it something you would like to dedicate more time 
and resources to preparing for? 
 
Is it something you think about as a major 
vulnerability to your system? 
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What is your level of concern about this topic? (On a 
scale from 1-10) 
 
 




More or less since your attack? 
What about colleagues at other systems talking 






Please explain a little about the sequence of events when 
your organization realized this was a malware attack. 
 
 
What did your initial response time look like? 
 
How did your organization realize they were 
infected with malware? 
 
 
Do you know how long the virus was in the 


























How much of an impact did this have on your system? 




How many hard drives were affected within 
your organization? 
What major applications were lost? 
Were any patient appointments impacted?--- 
Surgery, Inpatient, Outpatient? 
Was your data restore from backups?  How 
recent were the backups? 




Was more than one hospital impacted? 
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How many individuals were responding to this 
attack? 
• Staff from your facility 
• Staff from a health system 
• Staff from vendor companies 
 
 
What about this event made it different or the 
same? 




If different, what would you change to be more 










What were your organization’s preparedness efforts 
before the attack? 
What were your organization’s preparedness efforts 
after the attack? 
 




Cyber security training? Sending test phishing emails 










Do you feel there are barriers to preparing for this 
type of threat? 




Well that concludes all the questions I have, is there anything else you would like to add? Have I missed anything about your 
hospital’s event that you think is important for me to know? 
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Introduction: The healthcare industry has recently become the number one target for 
cyberattack in the United States.  As an industry, healthcare has become extremely dependent 
upon digital technologies for care delivery.  Cyberattacks threaten healthcare delivery and put 
patient lives and data at risk.  Federal requirements from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services on emergency preparedness help ensure hospitals’ abilities to respond to hazards 
while continuing to provide patient care.  How hospitals are applying to this mandate to cyber 
hazards against their organizations remains unclear, but evidence shows healthcare remains 
vulnerable.        
 
Methods: A survey tool was developed to assess organizational preparedness and individual 
perceptions of preparedness for cyberattack.  The survey was sent out to all emergency 
management/safety professionals within a statewide hospital association.  Descriptive statistics 
were used for the survey variables to provide insight into organizational readiness.   
 
Results: The response rate was 29.7% (n= 27) for emergency management/safety 
professionals.   Most (63%) emergency management respondents reported having cyber-
specific response protocols.  However, only a third of the same population reported having both 
an all-hazards plan and a continuity of operations plan that could be used for cyber incidents, 
although both are required by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.  Almost 30% of 
participants responded with not confident or only somewhat confident that their organizations 
could handle cyber threats against their systems.  The top barrier to organizations being more 
prepared for cyber threats was lack of financial resources.   
 
Discussion: Participants of the survey felt confident in their individual and organizational abilities 
to respond to a cyberattack, but when asked about their organization’s concrete preparedness 
actions their answers were not as strong.  While completing the survey participants may not 
have wanted to appear vulnerable and selected answers with higher confidence than they felt.  
Research shows this threat will continue to evolve and increase over time.  Healthcare must 
take steps to be more secure as an industry, including increased IT security and increased 
emergency management procedures.  While healthcare remains vulnerable, so too does patient 
data and safety.  It is essential for the healthcare industry to invest heavily in cybersecurity and 














In 2015, healthcare became the number one targeted industry for cyberattack (Morgan, 
2016).  The healthcare industry became into a prime target largely due to valuable health data 
which can be sold for a profit and their dependence on digital technology for patient care make 
them more likely to pay ransom (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016).  There were 
over 100 million healthcare records breached in 2015 (Morgan, 2016).  Then in 2016, 
cyberattacks on healthcare started to include ransom demands.  The first ransomware attack on 
a United States hospital occurred when hackers shut down access to the hospital’s digital 
network and demanded a ransom payment for the decryption key.  After a two-week standoff, 
the hospital made the ransom payment to regain access to their systems.    Since this initial 
attack, the healthcare industry has seen an increase in attacks, and the attempts against them 
are only expected to increase (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016).   
Cyberattacks against this industry threaten healthcare delivery as well as patient safety 
(Ayala, 2016).  A global ransomware attack in 2017 left hospitals across Great Britain locked out 
of their systems and the National Health Service was forced to cancel patient appointments and 
divert patients to unaffected emergency rooms (Graham, 2017).  This attack and the effects 
seen in Great Britain were said to have put patients’ lives directly at risk (Chappell & Neuman, 
2017).  One worry for future attacks is the vulnerability that exists with medical devices.  On 
average, one hospital room has up to 20 networked devices, and larger hospitals can have 
around 85,000 connected devices (Silverman, 2018).    Healthcare IT professionals express 
their concerns for these devices because they were designed by vendors who do not 
necessarily have security in mind.  These devices can serve as point of entry in to the network 
for hackers to gain access to health data or to alter the devices intended purpose (Ayala, 2016).   
 
 To ensure healthcare organizations (HCOs) are prepared for different hazards that 
threaten patient care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) developed 
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Emergency Preparedness requirements that Medicare and Medicaid service providers must 
follow.   As part of this regulation, providers are required to conduct a risk assessment and 
develop an emergency plan related to their top hazards, as well as to provide staff training and 
testing of their emergency plans annually (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).  
This emergency preparedness regulation is meant to ensure HCOs are ready to handle hazards 
that can impact their organizations while still providing care to the patients in their facilities and 
in their communities.    
 Even with these federally mandated requirements in place, the healthcare industry has 
not given enough credence to cyber threats within their assessments and plans.  Without an 
accurate representation of the risk these hazards pose to healthcare, the industry remains 
vulnerable to cybersecurity threats (Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 2017).  A recent 
study by the authors found hospitals who went through this type of event felt it was unlike any 
other emergency they’d dealt with in their healthcare experiences.  Respondents mentioned 
both the length of the event and the breadth of impact the event had on their organizations as 
key factors that differentiated it from other hazards.  Each of the facilities interviewed now have 
response protocols more tailored towards cyberattack.  Stakeholders also mentioned their 
concerns for the lack of information sharing across the healthcare industry with regards to how 
HCOs should best prepare for and respond to cyber hazards.   
 The focus of this study is to examine hospital readiness for cyber threats by asking what 
HCOs do to prepare for this hazard and what barriers are in place at the organizational level to 
increase preparedness and prevent successful attacks.  Currently, the healthcare industry has 
become the number one target for attempted breaches, and studies have shown they are 
behind other industries with security and preparedness in the cyber arena (Columbus, 2018; 
Kruse et al., 2017).  By collecting information on organizational preparedness, this study seeks 
to address the gap between awareness and preparedness and understanding the organizational 
barriers to mitigating cyber threats.  A survey was created based on existing literature and 
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previously conducted interviews with key stakeholders to help achieve this objective.  The 
survey was disseminated to safety/emergency management and information technology staff 
from healthcare organizations to measure their knowledge and their perceptions of the 
organization’s preparedness for cyber threats.  
 
Methods 
A survey with experimental design was developed and delivered to healthcare 
organizations to identify readiness levels as well as barriers to preparing for a cyberattack.  
Survey questions were developed based on background literature, as well as information 
collected during the previous trend analysis and stakeholder experience studies conducted by 
the authors.  Background conversations with subject matter experts, including hospital 
administrators, information technology experts, FBI agents, emergency managers, also shaped 
the survey questions.    
The first part of the survey collected demographic information from participants including 
department, age, education, and years of experience.  The next part of the survey measured 
organizational preparedness for cyberattacks based on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services Emergency Preparedness Ruling.  Participants were asked questions related to these 
requirements, such as how often their organizations are exercising their response plans, 
conducting staff awareness training, and doing risk assessments related to cyber vulnerabilities 
within their system (Graham, Shirm, Liggin, Altken, & Dick, 2006).  The final part of the survey 
gathered the participant’s perceptions of preparedness for cyber threats against healthcare.  
This section was broken in to two parts, the first examining participants’ perceptions of their own 
individual preparedness and the second examining participants’ perceptions of organizational 
preparedness (Dorn, Savoia, Testa, Stoto, & Marcus, 2007).   Topics covered in both sections, 
related to cyberattack, included performance of duties, providing assistance and information to 
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staff, contacting appropriate personnel, and handling the event.  A Likert-type scale was used 
with these questions to measure participant confidence.  Finally, participants were asked to rank 
their organizations overall preparedness for cyber incidents and identify any barriers that exist at 
an organizational level to being more prepared for this type of hazard.  This survey was created 
in REDCap, and a copy can be found in Appendix 2.   
The hospital association for one state agreed to participate in the study.  Staff of 
affiliated hospitals who work in hospital Emergency Management/Safety were asked to 
participate in the survey.   This member group has 91 members.  Due to the sensitive nature of 
the survey topic, the hospital association agreed to participate only if they were able to keep 
their member list private.  The researchers created a message which included a brief 
introduction, the purpose of the study, and a link to the survey.  The copy of the included cover 
letter is included in Appendix 1.  This message was sent out to the Emergency 
Management/Safety members by the hospital association liaison.  Individuals who wished to 
complete the survey were asked to consent by clicking on the link that took them directly to the 
online survey.  One additional follow-up email was sent by the hospital association as a 
reminder to members to complete the survey.   
There were also four IT participants who completed the survey.  They received the 
survey through emergency management/safety staff who forwarded the survey email and link to 
ask them to participate.  Although other statistical methods have been considered, the 
explorative nature of the hypothesis and data collection limit the scope of statistical 
methodology that can be applied. As the survey tool utilized is self-reported data, combined with 
the disparity of sample sizes among emergency management/safety and IT professionals, 
descriptive statistics provide insight into organizational readiness.  Descriptive statistics were 
calculated by professional title for all elements of the survey. Missing data is reported in the 
tables; however, frequencies and percentages do not include missing values in the respective 
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calculation. All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.4.  The survey results still provide 
valuable insight in to the perceptions of cyber preparedness across healthcare emergency 
management and safety professionals.  
Results 
There were 31 total survey respondents; 27 from emergency management/safety and 4 
from information technology.  The original objective of the study was to compare perceptions of 
preparedness between emergency management/safety professionals and information 
technology (IT) professionals.  A healthcare IT association located in the same state as the 
hospital association was pursued to participate in the survey, but they ultimately declined to 
have their members participate.  The survey had a 29.7% response rate from emergency 
management/safety professionals.  Due to the nature of how IT professionals received the 
survey link, their response rate is unknown.   
Respondent demographics are laid out in Table 1.  The survey sample from emergency 
management professionals was almost equally distributed between males and females, 
however the information technology participants were all males.  The average age of the 
emergency management group was 49.8 years old, whereas the average age of the information 
technology group was 42.7 years old.  The majority of respondents either had their bachelor’s 
degree or their master’s degree (a combined 67.7% of respondents).  The largest group of 
respondents had between 10 and 20 years of experience in their respective career fields.  Table 
1 also displays participants level of comfort using technology to complete daily tasks in their 
workplace.  Most respondents said they were very comfortable using technology (64.52%), 
whereas 35.48% of respondents said they were either comfortable or somewhat comfortable.  
When the information technology participants were removed from the sample, the level of 
comfort dropped to 59.2% of emergency management professionals responding with very 





This portion of the survey addressed federally mandated emergency preparedness 
requirements, as well as preparedness actions taken by the organizations to be more secure 
against cyber threats.  Results from this portion of the survey can be found in Table 2.  More 
than a quarter of emergency management participants (25.9%) and a quarter of information 
technology participants responded their organizations did not or only somewhat have enough 
resources to address cybersecurity concerns.   
There are different types of emergency plans that healthcare organizations use, an all-
hazards plan and a continuity of operations or business continuity plan, both required by CMS 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).  Both plans ensure healthcare providers 
can handle hazards that occur and get back to normal business in order to continue providing 
patient care and serving their community.  Only a third of emergency managers responded with 
having both plans capable of being used for cyber events.  Eight of the respondents (29.6%) 
said that in addition to these two plans, they also had cyber-specific response protocols.  
Twelve of the respondents (44.4%) only selected one of the plan options for their organization.      
Another requirement from CMS is for emergency plans to be drilled or exercised 
annually (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).  Nearly half of the participants 
said their organizations have either never drilled or exercised a cyber scenario or they did not 
know whether their organization had done so (48.1%).  When asked about another Emergency 
Preparedness Requirement, staff awareness training, two thirds of respondents said their 
organizations either never had training or had annual training.  During a previous study, IT and 
Emergency Management stakeholders expressed how often the field of cybersecurity is 
evolving and how it only takes one employee to have poor cyber-habits to let a hacker in to the 
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system.  The organizations from that project had been victims of malware attacks, and as part of 
their preparedness actions moving forward increased the amount of training they provide to staff 
to increase their overall security.  The final requirement of the Emergency Preparedness Ruling 
addressed in this survey is the need to conduct a facility risk assessment.  Survey respondents 
overwhelmingly (70%) replied their organization includes cybersecurity in their facility risk 
assessment at least annually.   
Perceptions of Preparedness 
 The perceptions portion of the survey utilized Likert Scale questions to obtain the 
respondents’ perceptions of cyber preparedness both as an individual and how they perceive 
their organization’s preparedness level.  The questions throughout this section appear to 
receive similar results.  On an individual level, most respondents said they were either 
somewhat confident or confident they could perform their response duties, provide information 
to others in the organization, and handle the event within their department (Table 3a).  The 
outlier of these questions was whether the respondents would be able to contact the appropriate 
personnel to activate their organization’s emergency response protocols.  Almost all the 
respondents (87.1%) expressed they were either confident or very confident with activation 
protocols.  This increased level of confidence could be due to activation of hospital emergency 
response protocols generally being the same for all hazards, and individuals feel confident in 
notifying the appropriate personnel from previous experiences.     
 Generally, the respondents answered the same for the questions related to 
organizational preparedness (Table 3b).  Between 19% and 30% of emergency management 
respondents selected somewhat confident to all questions, and between 50% and 70% of the 
same group selected confident.  The IT respondents on the other hand reported between 75% 
and 100% they were confident or very confident in their organizational preparedness levels.  
One interesting observation in this survey section is that 29% of respondents answered not 
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confident or somewhat confident regarding their organization ability to handle cyber threats that 
threaten their network.  This question received lower confidence rating that the other 
organizational preparedness questions, even though the other questions are all related to the 
ability for their organization to respond to a cyber threat.   
Participants were also asked to rate their organization’s overall preparedness for a cyber 
incident.  A third of respondents rated their organization’s overall preparedness as either not 
prepared or only somewhat prepared (Table 3c).   When asked whether their organization had 
experienced a significant security event in the last 12 months, the majority of respondents 
(83.9%) answered they had not (Table 2).  It is possible that this experience could impact their 
levels of confidence regarding their individual and organizational abilities to respond to 
cyberattack.  In future research, a larger sample size may be able to show whether experiencing 
a cyberattack has an impact on confidence levels related to organizational readiness. 
Barriers 
The final question of the survey asked participants what barriers to their organizations 
ability to be more prepared for cyberattacks (Table 3c).  The list of barriers was adapted from 
the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) Cybersecurity Survey. 
(HIMSS North America, 2018).  Five of the top six selected barriers from the HIMSS Survey 
were chosen for this survey.  The choices were selected based on answers to a barriers 
question during the stakeholder research project.  The top two barrier selections from the 
HIMSS survey swapped places with our survey respondents.  The highest rated barrier selected 
by respondents was lack of financial resources.  While this is not a new theme for barriers of 
hospital emergency preparedness, this was an interesting observation in this population 
because in Part 2 of the survey only 6.5% of respondents felt their organization did not have 
enough resources to address cybersecurity concerns (Cagliuso, 2014).  The second most 
selected barrier was lack of appropriate personnel.  In the previous study by the authors, 
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stakeholders noted a concern was lacking a full-time employee dedicated to emergency 
management at many facilities.  The stakeholders also noted the struggle of IT departments to 
stay on top of the constantly evolving cyber security front.  Related to the ever-changing nature 
of this threat, the third most selected barrier was too many new and emerging threats.  While 
barriers to healthcare emergency management exist for all hazards, healthcare has become the 
number one industry targeted for cyberattack.  To protect patient care and protected data, 
hospital administrators must realize how essential the roles of emergency management and 
information technology departments are to keep their systems secure.   
Discussion 
Data collected from this survey document participants perceptions of preparedness for 
cyberattack within their healthcare facility.  Overall, the survey results showed high confidence 
levels in individual ability and in organizational ability to respond to a cyberattack.  Almost all 
respondents (87.1%) said they were confident or very confident in their ability to contact the 
appropriate personnel for event response activation.  Regarding performance of individual 
response duties, 80% of participants answered they were either confident or very confident in 
their own ability.  Most participants (73.3%) answered confident or very confident in their 
organization’s ability to secure their system during a cyberattack, and eighty percent of 
participants gave the same answers regarding their organization’s ability to ensure continuation 
of patient care without digital technology.   
While the respondents answered with relatively high confidence levels about their 
preparedness perceptions, when asked about their organizations actions to be prepared for 
cyber threats a few disparities became apparent.  Only a third of survey participants reported 
having an all-hazards plan and a business continuity plan that could be used for cyberattacks, 
both of which are required by CMS for all providers to ensure the ability to handle hazards and 
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safeguard continuation of care.  While the question was related specifically to use against cyber 
hazards, the CMS requirements are meant to guarantee hospitals can protect patient care 
during any emergency event.  Without the ability to use their emergency plan during a 
cyberattack, it is unclear if the hospitals questioned have a plan to respond while safeguarding 
patient care.  Another discrepancy across survey responses was 74.1% of individuals reported 
their organization had enough resources to address cyber security concerns, yet when asked 
about barriers to being more prepared respondents’ top choices were lack of financial resources 
and lack of appropriate personnel.   
This study provided valuable insight in to the preparedness actions of healthcare 
facilities and stakeholders’ perceptions of their organizational ability to respond to a cyberattack.  
An objective of this survey, to compare perceptions between departments, was not fulfilled due 
to the small sample size.  The IT organization may have declined to participate due to the 
private nature of cyberattacks and the concern to admit vulnerabilities exist within the state.  
This same concern was expressed by the participating hospital association, however they were 
willing to participate as long as the association and its members could remain anonymous.  
While this survey had an average response rate for an online survey, the results may not be 
generalizable to all organizations statewide (Nulty, 2008).  Future research efforts need to focus 
on expanding the size of the sample population as well as gain more participation from 
association members.  It is also important to note that the survey questions were collecting 
information on the respondent’s perceptions of readiness to respond to a cyberattack and to 
continue providing patient care during an attack, but most facilities haven’t experienced a cyber 
attack.   Only 16.1% of respondents reported their organizations having had a significant 
security incident in the past 12 months.  Previous research has shown individuals who 
experience a cyberattack express a change in their understanding of what happens during 
attacks within healthcare organizations.  This would be another variable to consider comparing 
103 
 
preparedness perceptions across within a larger sample size.  Finally, due to the sensitive 
nature of this threat healthcare organizations across the country are choosing to keep 
information private.   This was a concern expressed by both professional groups approached to 
participate in this research project.  This desire to keep data confidential may have led to 
response bias in the survey results.  Respondents could have reported higher confidence levels 
not wanting their organization to seem vulnerable to such attacks.   This response bias could 
explain the differences seen between perceptions of preparedness and the preparedness 
actions seen across the participant organizations.   
Even though the participants in this survey reported feeling relatively confident in their 
organizations ability to respond to a cyberattack, previous research has shown individuals in 
healthcare are less confident overall about their system security and ability to respond to 
attacks.  A recent survey of Health IT professionals found that 60% were not confident in their 
medical devices security strategies to protect patient care (Silverman, 2018).  It is also apparent 
that healthcare remains vulnerable (Kasumov, 2018).  Healthcare Organizations have continued 
to be targeted and in 2018 there have been large scale cyberattacks against hospitals, 
healthcare providers, and third-party healthcare vendors (Duffy, 2018).  During these attacks, 
the reliability of all health data becomes questionable.  Organizations and providers must find 
out if the information they are seeing is accurate or has it been altered in some way, including 
data from patient records, diagnosis equipment, and treatment equipment (Ayala, 2016).  
Without accurate patient records and histories, patient care can be put at risk (Lachance, 2016).   
This category of threat is different in nature than any other threat healthcare handles.  
Healthcare is used to a certain level of downtime, but previous studies have shown this is unlike 
any downtime they have prepared for.  During cyberattacks, every digital device and application 
within the facility can go down at one time and there is the potential for these to remain offline 
for an extended period.  To be prepared, HCOs need to include cyber hazards when conducting 
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risk assessments and to reevaluate emergency plans to ensure they account for these cyber 
incidents.  It is essential for hospitals to have plans in place to ensure continuation of care and 
patient safety during this level of downtime.  HCOs also need to develop an exercise and drilling 
plan to practice their cyber procedures with employees, as well as strengthen their training 
programs with staff members to ensure their staff know what to do and how to remain vigilant 
(Rafee, 2018).   The banking industry used to be the number one targeted area for cyberattacks 
in 2014, but after a surge in their cybersecurity budgets banking dropped down to number three 
in 2015 (Morgan, 2016).   
The healthcare industry itself is also changing and becoming even more dependent on a 
digital environment.  With new delivery avenues becoming more popular, such as telemedicine 
and patient portals, the attack surface within the field is expanding (Adefala, 2018; Sullivan, 
2018.  This threat against healthcare is not disappearing, and cyberattacks are expected to 
increase (Duffy, 2018).  Barriers identified by study participants include lack of financial 
resources and lack of appropriate personnel.  Federal funding for the Hospital Preparedness 
Program has been cut by 50% over the last 15 years from $515 million in FY2003 to $255 
million in FY2017 (Watson, Watson, & Sell, 2017).  There is a need for sustained federal 
support for hospital emergency preparedness to sustain their response capabilities.  Another 
source of funding could come from the healthcare organizations themselves.  Currently, 
healthcare is the now the second biggest sector of the United States’ economy, yet the 
healthcare industry only spends about half on cybersecurity as other industries (Silverman, 
2018).  Cases need to be made for the return on investment (ROI) to advancing cybersecurity 
resources (Adefala, 2018; Rafee, 2018).  Data about the risk and impact of cyberattacks needs 
to be made more readily available for healthcare.  This data along with identification of best 
practices from case studies can be used to make ROI cases to hospital administrators.  The 
healthcare industry needs to become more open about these attacks to identify best practices 
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and pool their preparedness resources.  These attacks will continue to get more sophisticated 
and continue to threaten patient care and safety.  Research has shown all devices in the 
healthcare setting are at risk of being infiltrated and altered.  The healthcare industry is charged 
with doing no harm to the population they serve, and to do nothing for such a clear threat is 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Demographic Information 
Table 1. Demographic Information 
Response Variables by Department 
Total                                 





Technology                       
(N = 4) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Age* 48.93 (10.42) 49.85 (10.38) 42.75 (9.67) 
Gender 
Male 17 (54.84) 13 (48.15) 4 (100.00) 
Female 14 (45.16) 14 (51.85) 0 (0.00) 
Education Level 
Doctorate Degree 1 (3.23) 1 (3.70) 0 (0.00) 
Master's Degree 11 (35.48) 10 (37.04) 1 (25.00) 
Bachelor's Degree 10 (32.26) 7 (25.93) 3 (75.00) 
Associate Degree 4 (12.90) 4 (14.81) 0 (0.00) 
High School / GED 4 (12.90) 4 (14.81) 0 (0.00) 
Other 1 (3.23) 1 (3.70) 0 (0.00) 
Years of Experience 
0 - 10 6 (19.35) 5 (18.52) 1 (25.00) 
10 - 20 12 (38.71) 10 (37.04) 2 (50.00) 
20 - 30 6 (19.35) 6 (22.22) 0 (0.00) 
30 - 40 5 (16.13) 4 (14.81) 1 (25.00) 
40 - 50 2 (6.45) 2 (7.41) 0 (0.00) 
How comfortable do you feel 
using technology in your 
workplace to complete your 
daily tasks? 
Not Comfortable 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Comfortable 3 (9.68) 3 (11.11) 0 (0.00) 
Comfortable 8 (25.81) 8 (29.63) 0 (0.00) 
Very Comfortable 20 (64.52) 16 (59.26) 4 (100.00) 




Table 2: Cyber Preparedness- Emergency Management Requirements 
Table 2. Preparedness Information 
Response Variables by Department 
Total                                 
(N = 31) 
Emergency 
Management/Safety 
(N = 27) 
Information 
Technology                       
(N = 4) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Do you feel your organization has enough 
resources to address cybersecurity concerns? 
Yes 23 (74.19) 20 (74.07) 3 (75.00) 
Somewhat 6 (19.35) 6 (22.22) 0 (0.00) 
No 2 (6.45) 1 (3.70) 1 (25.00) 
Does your organization have an emergency 
plan for cyber events? 
None 1 (3.23) 1 (3.70) 0 (0.00) 
Cyber-Specific Response 
Protocols 
19 (60.29) 17 (62.96) 2 (50.00) 
All-Hazards Plan 7 (22.58) 6 (22.22) 1 (25.00) 
Continuity of Operations Plan  3 (9.68) 3 (11.11) 0 (0.00) 
Other 1 (3.23) 0 (0.00) 1 (25.00) 
Does your organization drill or exercise its 
response to a cyber event for staff to know 
what steps to take to mitigate the effects of a 
successful attack? 
Never 10 (32.26) 8 (29.63) 2 (50.00) 
Yearly 15 (48.39) 13 (48.15) 2 (50.00) 
Quarterly 1 (3.23) 1 (3.70) 0 (0.00) 
Monthly 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Do Not Know 5 (16.13) 5 (18.52) 0 (0.00) 
How comfortable do you feel using technology 
in your workplace to complete your daily 
tasks? 
Never 7 (22.58) 6 (22.22) 1 (25.00) 
Yearly 15 (48.39) 12 (44.44) 3 (75.00) 
Quarterly 6 (19.35) 6 (22.22) 0 (0.00) 
Monthly 1 (3.23) 1 (3.70) 0 (0.00) 
Do Not Know 2 (6.45) 2 (7.41) 0 (0.00) 
Does your organization do cybersecurity risk 
assessments to identify system vulnerabilities? 
Never 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Yearly 12 (38.71) 9 (33.33) 3 (75.00) 
Quarterly 5 (16.13) 5 (18.52) 0 (0.00) 
Monthly 6 (19.35) 5 (18.52) 1 (25.00) 
Do Not Know 8 (25.51) 8 (29.63) 0 (0.00) 
Has your organization experienced a 
significant security incident in the past 12 
months? 
Yes 5 (16.13) 5 (18.52) 0 (0.00) 
No 22 (70.97) 22 (81.48) 4 (100.00) 
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Table 3a: Perceptions of Individual Preparedness for Cyber Hazards 
Table 3a. Preparedness Perceptions 
In the event of a cyber-event, how well do you feel you will 
be able to: 
Total                                 
(N = 31) 
Emergency 
Management/Safety 
(N = 27) 
Information 
Technology                       
(N = 4) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Perform response duties you will 
be expected to accomplish? 
Not Confident 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Confident 6 (20.00) 6 (23.08) 0 (0) 
Confident 21 (70.00) 18 (69.23) 3 (75) 
Very Confident 3 (10.00) 2 (7.69) 1 (25) 
Missing* 1 1 0 
Provide assistance and 
information to others within 
organization? 
Not Confident 1 (3.23) 1 (3.7) 0 (0) 
Somewhat Confident 7 (22.58) 7 (25.93) 0 (0) 
Confident 18 (58.06) 14 (51.85) 4 (100) 
Very Confident 5 (16.13) 5 (18.52) 0 (0) 
Contact the appropriate 
personnel to activate event 
response? 
Not Confident 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Confident 4 (12.90) 4 (14.81) 0 (0) 
Confident 14 (45.16) 12 (44.44) 2 (50) 
Very Confident 13 (41.94) 11 (40.74) 2 (50) 
Handle the event within your 
department/team? 
Not Confident 1 (3.23) 1 (25) 0 (0) 
Somewhat Confident 6 (19.35) 0 (0) 6 (22.22) 
Confident 16 (51.61) 2 (50) 14 (51.85) 
Very Confident 8 (25.81) 1 (25) 7 (25.93) 

















Table 3b: Perceptions of Organizational Preparedness for Cyber Hazards 
Table 3b. Preparedness Perceptions 
Presently, how well do you think your organization is 
able to: 
Total                                 
(N = 31) 
Emergency 
Management/Safety 
(N = 27) 
Information 
Technology                       
(N = 4) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Perform response duties your 
organization will be expected to 
accomplish? 
Not Confident 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Confident 7 (23.33) 7 (26.92) 0 (0.00) 
Confident 20 (66.67) 16 (61.54) 4 (100.00) 
Very Confident 3 (10.00) 3 (11.54) 0 (0.00) 
Missing* 1 1 0 
Provide assistance and 
information to staff within the 
main hospital? 
Not Confident 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Confident 5 (16.67) 5 (19.23) 0 (0.00) 
Confident 22 (73.33) 18 (69.23) 4 (100.00) 
Very Confident 3 (10.00) 3 (11.54) 0 (0.00) 
Missing* 1 1 0 
Provide assistance and 
information to staff within 
satellite offices/ambulatory care 
centers?  
Not Confident 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Confident 7 (25.93) 7 (29.17) 0 (0.00) 
Confident 19 (70.37) 16 (66.67) 3 (100.00) 
Very Confident 0 (0.00) 1 (4.17) 0 (0.00) 
Missing* 4 3 1 
Secure the system (i.e. stop the 
spread of virus)? 
Not Confident 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Confident 8 (26.67) 7 (26.92) 1 (25.00) 
Confident 17 (56.67) 15 (57.69) 2 (50.00) 
Very Confident 5 (16.67) 4 (15.38) 1 (25.00) 
Missing* 1 1 0 
Ensure continuation of patient 
care (i.e. switch to pen and 
paper records)? 
Not Confident 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Confident 6 (20.00) 5 (19.23) 1 (25) 
Confident 20 (66.67) 18 (69.23) 2 (50) 
Very Confident 4 (13.33) 3 (11.54) 1 (25) 
Missing* 1 1 0 
Handle potential cyber threats 
that threaten your network? 
Not Confident 1 (3.33) 1 (3.85) 0 (0) 
Somewhat Confident 8 (26.67) 7 (26.92) 1 (25) 
Confident 14 (46.67) 13 (50) 1 (25) 
Very Confident 7 (22.58) 5 (19.23) 2 (50) 
Missing* 1 1 0 






Table 3c: Overall Preparedness Perceptions for Cyber Hazards 
Table 3c. Preparedness Perceptions 
Response Question by Department 
Total                                 
(N = 31) 
Emergency 
Management/Safety 
(N = 27) 
Information 
Technology                       
(N = 4) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Overall, how would you rate your 
organization's preparedness level 
to respond to and mitigate the 
effects of a cybersecurity 
incident? 
Not Prepared 1 (3.33) 1 (3.85) 0 (0.00) 
Somewhat Prepared 8 (26.67) 7 (26.92) 1 (25.00) 
Prepared 17 (56.67) 14 (53.85) 3 (75.00) 
Very Prepared 4 (13.33) 4 (29.63) 0 (0.00) 
Missing* 1 1 0 
What do you feel the biggest 
barriers are to your organization 
being MORE prepared for a 
cybersecurity incident?  
Lack of Appropriate Personnel 6 (20.00) 5 (19.23) 1 (25.00) 
Lack of Financial Resources 8 (26.67) 7 (26.92) 1 (25.00) 
Too Many Application Vulnerabilities 1 (3.33) 1 (3.85) 0 (0.00) 
Too Many Endpoints to the Network 3 (10.00) 3 (11.54) 0 (0.00) 
Too Many New and Emerging Threats 5 (16.67) 4 (15.38) 1 (25.00) 
Complex Network Infrastructure 
Unable to be Properly Secured 
2 (6.67) 1 (3.85) 1 (25.00) 
Other 2 (6.67) 2 (7.69) 0 (0.00) 
Do Not Know 3 (10.00) 3 (11.54) 0 (0.00) 
Missing* 1 1 0 
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Appendix 2: Healthcare Cyber Preparedness and Perceptions Survey 
 
Healthcare Cyber Preparedness and Perceptions 
y plete. 10 minutes to com proximatel  will take ap yThis research surve Your answers will remain anonymous, and all 
data will be reported in aggregate. Your participation is completely voluntary. You may skip any question that you do 
not wish to answer, and you may discontinue at any time. 
When finished, please click the " Submit " button at the bottom of the survey. 
Thank you for your time and help with this project. 
Part 1: Demographic Information 
1.1 What is your gender?   Male 
  Female 
reset 
1.2 What is your age (in years)? 
1.3 Which of the following departments do you work in? 
  Emergency Management/Safety 






 1.4 Which of the following best describes your job title?  
 Executive Management 
 Non-Executive Management (i.e. midlevel 
or senior management) 




1.5 How many years of experience do you have in your 
career field? 
 
 1.6 What is your level of education?  
 Doctorate Degree (i.e. PhD, MD) 
 Master's Degree 
 Bachelor's Degree 
 Associate's Degree 
 High School/GED 
 Other 
reset 
1.7 Do you have any professional certifications related 




1.8 How comfortable do you feel using technology in 
your workplace to complete your daily tasks? 
 Not Comfortable 
 Somewhat Comfortable 
 Comfortable 








Part 2: Preparedness Information 
2.1 Do you feel your organization has enough 
resources to address cybersecurity concerns? 
 Yes 
 Somewhat 
 No  
reset 
  
 2.2 Does your organization have an emergency plan for None 
cyber events? (Select all that apply) 
Cyber-specific response 
protocols 
 All-hazards plan 
Continuity of Operations Plan 
(COOP) 
 Other 
 2.3 Does your organization drill or exercise its                          Never
response to a cyber event for staff to know what 








 2.4 Does your organization hold cybersecurity                  Never 
awareness training for staff to prevent a successful 
attack (i.e. how to avoid click baits)?                                    Yearly 
 Quarterly 
 Monthly 
 Don't Know 
reset 
2.5 Does your organization do cybersecurity risk  Never                            




 Don't Know 
 reset 
2.6 Has your organization experienced a significant                   Yes 
security incident in the past 12 months? 
 No 
           reset 
Part 3: Preparedness Perceptions 
  
  
In the event of a cyber-event, how well do you feel you will be able to: 
Somewhat 
 Not Confident Confident Confident Very Confident 
 
3.1.1 Perform response duties you will be 
expected to accomplish? 
  
reset 
3.1.2 Provide assistance and information to 





3.1.3 Contact the appropriate personnel to 
activate event response? 
  
reset 















Confident Confident Very Confident 
3.2.1 Perform response duties your organization 
will be expected to accomplish? 
   
reset 
3.2.2 Provide assistance and information to staff 
within the main hospital? 
   
reset 
3.2.3 Provide assistance and information to staff 
within satellite 
offices/ambulatory care centers? (If this 
is not applicable to your organization, 
please leave blank) 
   
reset 
3.2.4 Secure the system (i.e. stop the spread of 
virus)? 
   
reset 
3.2.5 Ensure continuation of patient care (i.e. 
switch to pen and paper records)? 
   
reset 
3.2.6 Handle potential cyber threats that 
threaten your network? 
   
reset 
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3.3 Overall, how would you rate your organization's 
preparedness level to respond to and mitigate the 
effects of a cybersecurity incident? 
 Not Prepared 
 Somewhat Prepared 
 Prepared 
 Very Prepared 
reset 
   
3.4 What do you feel the biggest barriers are to your 
organization being MORE prepared for a                             c                      
cybersecurity incident (Select all that apply): 
 Lack of 
appropriate 
personnel 
 Lack of 
financial 
resources 
 Too many 
application 
vulnerabilities 



























The United States healthcare industry has recently found itself a target for 
cybercriminals.  As the field shifted towards electronic medical records, hackers realized they 
could access valuable information worth even more than identity or financial information (Yao, 
2017).  Since 2015, healthcare has become the number one targeted industry for cyber 
breaches (Columbus, 2018).  There were over 1.9 million individuals impacted by reported data 
breaches caused by hacking or IT incident in 2017 alone (United States Department of Health 
and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2016).   
A shift in cyber threats within healthcare was seen in 2016 as the first hospital was hit 
with a ransomware attack.  Ransomware attacks are a type of cyberattack where hackers 
deliver a malware virus to a hospital network and can essentially lock the hospital out of their 
own system while demanding a ransom payment for the decryption key.  Hollywood 
Presbyterian Hospital in Los Angeles, California was offline for over a week before settling with 
hackers to pay a $17,000 ransom (Winton, 2016).   
Due to the growing use of electronic medical records and the increasing dependence on 
technology for care delivery, hospitals make a target often willing to pay to get their systems 
back up and running.  Patient care systems that can potentially be impacted during these 
cyberattacks include patient history and medical charts, laboratory testing, diagnostic imaging, 
medication dispensing, medical devices, and treatment devices.  Without access to historical 
data or these patient care systems providers may not be providing the best care or there could 
be delays in care provided.  This type of attack a healthcare facility can potentially put patient 
safety at risk.    Since this first ransomware attack against the healthcare field, the trend has 
only continued to grow (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016).  While this hazard 
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continues to threaten healthcare, data are still lacking regarding frequency, impact, and 
recommended actions for healthcare organizations.   
Summary of Key Findings 
 This research project was meant to serve as an exploratory study to examine an 
emerging threat to public health.  The overall purpose was to provide descriptive data on how 
cyberattacks impact the four phases of the emergency cycle (preparedness, response, 
mitigation, and recovery) within healthcare organizations (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2014).  Data on publicly reported malware attacks was compiled in Study 1 
(Chapter 2) to assess attack trends.  Study 2 (Chapter 3) examined organizational practices on 
mitigation and recovery from malware attacks.  Data on organizational preparedness for cyber 
threats was collected in Study 3 (Chapter 4).  Due to this being a relatively new threat for 
healthcare, research on the area is limited (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016; Kruse, 
Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 2017).  The data collected from the studies as part of this 
research project help to fill the gap in knowledge and help to elucidate the threat cyberattacks 
pose to healthcare.     
 The trend analysis of public data identified 49 malware attacks on United States 
healthcare providers between 2016 and 2017.   Attacks occurred across 27 states, with 
California seeing the highest frequency at 9 attacks during the two year time frame.  Forty-one 
of the attacks were labeled ransomware and eight of the incidents were labeled malware.  Six of 
the organizations reported paying ransom, whereas 43 organizations did not pay or did not 
report payment to the press.  The analysis identified a range of organizational impacts from 
network downtime to patient and staff records being breached.  The longest downtime reported 
was 3 weeks, and there were four attacks that reported having more than 200,000 records 
breached.  This was the first known content analysis to summarize malware attack trends in 
detail seen on United States healthcare providers, however reports from expert agencies report 
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higher frequencies of attacks.  The Healthcare Information Management Systems Society 
conducts a cybersecurity survey each year and the 2018 survey revealed 75.7% of respondents 
reported a significant security incident in the past 12 months (HIMSS North America, 2018).  
While this is a large percentage, it is important to note the survey sample size was 239 
healthcare organizations.  Even though healthcare is facing this new threat, as an industry they 
remain private when choosing to report these incidents due to the nature of attack and the 
potential threat to patient care as well as the potential impact on the organization’s business 
reputation for keeping information secure.  This lack of reporting could explain the low number 
or attacks found in public sources within the trend analysis.   
 Study 2 (Chapter 3) used data collected from stakeholder interviews to examine 
organizational mitigation and recovery from malware attacks.  The three organizations that 
participated in this study experienced complete shutdowns of their networks during their 
malware attack.  The network outages lasted varying amounts of time based on how far the 
virus was able to infect their systems.  Two of the organizations saw devastating impacts and 
were forced to operate within the incident command structure for over a month.  These 
organizations had to rebuild their networks with a cost upwards of $10 million.  Stakeholders 
from all categories (administrators, emergency managers, and information technology 
managers) expressed this event being different from any other emergency they have faced 
while in their healthcare careers.  One of the key themes that emerged from the stakeholders 
interviews was the realization of how technologically dependent they have become in healthcare 
provision.  One hospital administrator explained they are no longer able to take a blood sugar 
reading without access to their electronic medical record.  Stakeholders expressed concern for 
this reliance on technology, but also expressed the benefit of technology in the health field.  
Stakeholders expressed frustration in the reporting privacy that exists within the healthcare field.  
They also identified the need for their industry to be more open with regard to cyberattack data.  
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Multiple interview subjects believe this data would be useful in providing more accurate risk 
assessments and give them the information they need to convince administrators to make 
system improvements to become more secure.    The identification of the need to convince 
administration to invest in safety and emergency management solutions is nothing new to the 
field of hospital emergency management (Cagliuso, 2014a; Cagliuso, 2014b).  However, 
cyberattacks create a different need for emergency preparedness solutions that is not similar to 
the other hazards healthcare faces.   
This final study of this project (Chapter 4) expanded knowledge on organizational 
preparedness for cyber threats.  A survey was developed and delivered to emergency 
managers within a statewide hospital association.  The majority (63%) of emergency managers 
reported having cyber-specific protocols within their organization.  However, only a third of 
respondents reported having both an all-hazards plan and a continuity of operations plan that 
could be used during cyberattack.  Both of these plans are requirements of Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and as part of the CMS Emergency Preparedness 
Ruling must reflect the hazards identified in the facility’s thorough hazard vulnerability 
assessment.  With only a third of emergency managers reporting having plans that address 
cyber threats, the other two thirds of participants must either feel they are not at risk for a 
cyberattack or did not consider cyber threats to their organizations while conducting their risk 
assessments.  Also, 30% of participants responded with confidence or somewhat confident their 
organizations could handle cyber threats against their systems.  Based on Study 2, these 
responses were unexpected because the participants said this was unlike any other emergency 
they had faced and also felt they had misjudged the impact these attacks could have on their 
system.  When asked if their organizations could handle threats against their systems, almost 
30% the survey participants reported they were not confident or only somewhat confident.   
Finally, the survey asked about barriers to being more prepared and the participants identified 
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lack of financial resources as the biggest barrier.  While this is not unlike other healthcare 
emergency management literature, it was unexpected because when asked if their 
organizations have enough resources dedicated to cybersecurity 74% of emergency managers 
answered ‘yes’ (Cagliuso, 2014a, Cagliuso 2014b).  Response bias may have been a factor for 
higher levels of confidence being reported than have been seen in other healthcare surveys.  
Due to the private nature of healthcare regarding this threat topic, respondents may have 
responded with higher confidence not wanting to make the state hospital association seem 
vulnerable to attack.    
Discussion 
News and industry reports make it clear cyberattacks pose a real threat to healthcare 
and are only expected to grow as a threat over time (Kasumov, 2018; Kruse et al., 2017; Luna 
et al.).  A recent report estimated healthcare experiences twice the number of cyberattacks as 
seen in other industries (Adefala, 2018).  The studies in this research project more clearly 
illustrate what threat cyberattacks can pose to the healthcare industry.  Data from studies 
showed the frequency and impact of malware attacks as well as the steps being taken by 
organizations to prepare for and to mitigate the effects of attacks.  Across all studies, three main 
points related to cybersecurity and public health preparedness were identified.   
One point that appeared across all three studies was the current lack of research related 
to cyberattacks and healthcare organizations.  A 2017 systematic review found 31 articles 
related to cyberattacks and healthcare and the reviewers noted most of the articles found were 
news articles and not academic articles (Kruse et al., 2017).  Not only is there lack of research 
on this topic, but participants in the studies pointed out a lack of accessible data for those in the 
field.  The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) collects data related to cyberattacks across all 
industries.  The FBI reported in 2015 they had received over 2,500 complaints of ransomware 
across all industries (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016).  We also know they have 
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data because their local Fusion Centers are often called when a healthcare organizations is 
attacked and local agents go out to the site to assist with response and collect evidence for 
forensic testing.  This participation by FBI agents was confirmed by participants in Study 2 when 
discussing their organizational response to attack.  Even though the FBI has this data, inquiries 
to gain access to the data reports or to separate out healthcare data from other industries were 
often met with refusals.  I experienced these refusals when talking to two separate FBI agents 
and stakeholders from Study 2 reported the same experiences.  There is also public access to 
data related to data breaches via the DHHS Office for Civil Rights breach portal.  The recent 
JAMA Article published in 2018 reviewed this data and showed that hacking and IT incidents 
have not become the number one breach type.  This data is not able to be further classified by 
what type of hacking or IT incident, such as malware or ransomware attack.  There are also 
limitations on this data set because it only contains incidents that were reported due to data 
breach.  The studies conducted as part of this project identified cyber attack cases where no 
breach was reported, and therefore the breach data is not inclusive of all malware attacks seen 
on healthcare providers.   
In addition to existing data being hard to access, the healthcare industry is also relatively 
secretive regarding their attacks.  As seen in Study 1 where only 49 malware attacks were 
located in publicly reported information, based on existing statistics we know this number is an 
extremely low estimate.  With my own experience as an emergency management employee of a 
healthcare organization during malware attack, administrators were very reticent about letting 
the public know they were under attack.  They expressed concern that patients would worry 
about their safety when coming in for surgeries or that patients would unnecessarily be 
concerned with their data privacy.  This sentiment was also noted during interviews in Study 2.  
Healthcare Organizations have both an ethical obligation to protect patients as well as a legal 
obligation to protect patients’ data.  An admission of a cyberattack could potentially be an 
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admission to breaking either or both of these professional obligations.  In order for healthcare to 
be as prepared as they need to be for cybersecurity incidents, it is imperative that individuals in 
the field of emergency management, safety, and information technology have accurate data that 
represents the risks these threats pose to healthcare.  With accurate and complete information, 
they can more precisely classify cyber threats to their organizations on their risk assessments 
and dedicate the needed resources to securing their digital environment.   
Another point that was made within this research project is the potential cyberattacks 
have to impact patient safety, both directly and indirectly.  During one of the global malware 
attacks, patient safety was determined to have been directly put at risk by the effects of the 
attack (Chappell & Neuman, 2017).  These effects included loss of access to patient records 
and patient care equipment, as well as the diversion of patients en route to impacted hospitals 
being sent further away and delaying the medical care they required.  While limited data 
currently exists in the academic arena, the healthcare and emergency management fields all 
agree cyberattacks have the potential to negatively impact patient safety (Ayala, 2016; 
Lachance, 2016; Barnett, Snell, Lord, Jenkins, Terbush, & Burke, 2013).  Stakeholders in Study 
2 identified potential for patient care impact during these events, however they were quick to 
say they did not see a negative patient impact.  One potential explanation for this is that while 
the network is down so too is the error reporting within electronic medical records.  Another 
potential explanation for this is a legal requirement to keep the information confidential.  Multiple 
stakeholders asked during the interviews if their organization had given legal clearance to 
discuss their facilities attack.  So although they did not report a negative patient impact, there is 
still the potential that it existed.   
There is also literature that suggests the potential for active medical devices on the 
network to become victims of cyberattack (Ayala, 2016; TrapX Labs, 2015).  One of these 
reports reviews case studies where hackers used medical devices to gain access to a network 
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(TrapX Labs, 2015).  While this report does not show evidence hackers used active medical 
devices to alter patient care, it does show hackers have the ability to remotely gain access to 
these devices.  The other report goes more in detail about how hackers could potentially use 
this access to hold patient’s lives on the line in exchange for ransom rather than locking 
organizations out of their digital network (Ayala, 2016).  A more common concern regarding 
cyberattacks and patient safety is the reliability of health data being reported by patient care 
equipment.  Stakeholders in Study 2 expressed a concern their organization and providers had 
during their attack to ensure all health data was accurately being relayed from one digital 
platform to another.  Patient care can be put at risk without access to up to date patient histories 
and records (Lachance, 2016).    
This threat also has the ability to impact patient health through the hospital environment.  
One of the organizations that participated in Study 2 saw impacts to their HVAC systems.  They 
were forced to manually monitor air flow and temperature around their facility.  If they had been 
unable to keep safe temperature and air quality control, the facility would have been forced to 
evacuate their patients.  As seen in extreme weather conditions, such as Hurricanes Katrina, 
and Sandy, evacuation of a hospital can be a complex task requiring coordination between large 
amounts of staff and resources (Adalja, Watson, Bouri, Minton, Morhard, & Toner, 2014; NPR, 
2013).  Another of the organizations interviewed in Study 2 reported seeing impacts to their 
security cameras.  Due to their inability to visually monitor their entrances and exits, the facility 
was forced to go in to lockdown and had to increase security presence.  If someone with ill 
intent were to enter the hospital during security downtime due to a cyberevent there is the 
potential in that scenario as well for patients or visitors of the facility to be injured.    
The final point emphasized across this research project is the healthcare field remains 
vulnerable to cyberattack and needs more efforts for preparedness and security (Kasumov, 
2018; Kruse et al., 2017).  This industry lags behind other industries in cybersecurity, with many 
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organizations having out of date cybersecurity systems and not enough training for staff on safe 
cyber practices (Kruse et al., 2017).  Even though healthcare has become the number one 
targeted industry for cyberattack, they only spend about half as much as other sectors on 
securing their digital platforms (Silverman, 2018).  There has been a 50% decrease in funding 
for federal hospital emergency preparedness funding over the last 15 years (Watson, Watson, & 
Sell, 2017).  There is a need for sustained funding to assist in healthcare’s overall emergency 
preparedness needs.  However, federal funding is only meant to serve as supplemental funding 
for emergency preparedness.  Healthcare is now the second largest sector of the U.S. economy 
and they should be designating funds in their budgets to improve both safety and emergency 
management as well as cybersecurity (Silverman, 2018).  As the industry expands delivery of 
care to more digital platforms, healthcare organizations need to make a more concerted effort to 
secure patient privacy and ensure safe provision of care.   
Future Research & Conclusions  
With the increased trend in attack occurrence, there seems to be an increase in the 
number of articles related to this topic.  A systematic review published in 2016 included 19 
articles from 2008 and 2015, whereas a systematic review published in 2017 included 31 
articles the majority of which were published in 2016.  However, many of these articles are still 
news articles rather than academic articles.  There is literature related to cybersecurity issues in 
information technology literature as well as some literature within cyber insurance literature.  
Both of these literature categories fail to focus on what the disaster recovery cycle at an 
organizational looks like during cyberattacks or how this threat compares to other threats 
against healthcare.   
This research project served as an exploratory study in to the new and emerging field of 
cyber threats against healthcare organizations.  The studies within this project focused on 
providing novel data related to the trends, impacts, response, mitigation, and preparation 
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specifically related to malware attacks against healthcare at the organizational level.  The data 
collected in this project provided a descriptive overview of the topic, but future research is 
needed on the topic to fully define the risk cyber threats are to the healthcare industry. 
A more systematic approach to collecting attack data is necessary to complete a 
thorough risk assessment for the healthcare industry.  As recommended above, a public data 
depository for cyberattacks, similar to the Department of Health and Human Services Data 
Breath Portal, would be an excellent answer for healthcare providers.  This would allow any 
individual in the healthcare field to access data and make determinations on their organization’s 
risk based on certain characteristics such as size of facility and geographic location.  This 
database would also house information regarding the impact of each attach, similar to the 
DHHS database displaying number of individuals impacted.  One suggestion on how to 
accomplish this is a federal regulation similar to the DHHS requirement for providers to report 
data breaches to the Office for Civil Rights.  While this rule leaves reporting ultimately up to the 
provider to determine whether a breach occurred, due to HIPAA laws and the potential for 
liability it seems many providers do report.  A ruling to develop a reporting requirement would be 
a push for healthcare providers to make more information on cyberattacks public.  Again, this 
information could be used by healthcare organizations to complete a more accurate risk 
assessment.   
Another future area key to public health research is more evidence-based projects 
looking at the effects of cyberattacks on patient safety.  There is a lot of speculation on potential 
and determination from previous attacks that patient safety was put at risk, but there are not 
studies who look at this from a research perspective.  Other research could be completed 
looking at what else within a hospital could be potentially impacted by cyberattacks.  This study 
showed an example of an HVAC system and a security system being impacted, but what other 
environmental control or safety systems are on a network that could be impacted.  There is talk 
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within the healthcare community that elevators have been hacked in to and stopped, but this is 
not in the research literature.  Quantitative research studies would be key to giving hospital 
stakeholders the data they need to convince administrators to make system security and 
preparedness improvements.   
Equally important to having data to convince decision makers to act, is understanding 
the difference of perspectives across departments.  A few perspective differences were noted 
within interviews of Study 2 between the stakeholder departments.  These differences were 
meant to be explored as part of the original objective of Study 3; however the IT group declined 
to participate and therefore the sample size was not large enough for comparison.  This is a 
research area that is important to examine as knowledge of these differences could be used to 
get all stakeholders across the organization to agree on best approaches for improved 
preparedness.    
Cyber threats to healthcare are not going to dissipate any time in the near future.  A 
publication from the American Public Health Association estimates over the next five years 
cyberattacks will cost our nation’s healthcare system $305 billion in revenue and will affect 1 in 
every 13 patients (Krisberg, 2017).   Hospitals are a major part to our nation’s response network 
and they are tasked with serving their communities (Barnett et al., 2013).  During emergencies, 
hospitals must be able to safely care for patients on hand as well as handle a surge coming 
from within their community.  Data collected in this research project shows cyberattacks are 
unlike any hazard or emergency the healthcare industry has faced to date.  The impacts of this 
type of event have the ability to completely shut down an organizations digital network.  These 
events can also last much longer than normal healthcare emergency situations.  Healthcare 
organizations need to expand their emergency operating procedures to include cyberattack.  
Many of the participants in this study identified the need for healthcare organizations to develop 
a supplementary plan for cyber threats due to their variance from the all-hazards response and 
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recovery.  Data reports show that despite a clear threat to healthcare and patient safety, the 
health sector remains vulnerable to attack (Kruse et al., 2017).  It is imperative that healthcare 
organizations heed this call to action to better prepare their organizations to handle this new 
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